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Articles
Condemnation Without Basis: An Expressive
Failure of Corporate Prosecutions
Gregory M. Gilchrist*
This is the second of two Articles on the expressive aspects of corporate criminal
liability. The first Article argued that to justify imposing criminal liability on
corporations we must refer to the expressive function of criminal liability. This Article
considers the expressive function of actual corporate prosecutions and identifies aspects
of corporate prosecutions that generate expressive costs rather than benefits. These are
the expressive failures of corporate prosecutions. This Article identifies a number of
these failures and introduces a model of perceived legitimacy and the expressive
function of punishment that explains how expressive failures harm the legal system.
Mere respondeat superior liability—holding corporations criminally liable where there
is no basis to condemn the corporation qua corporation—is the most significant
expressive failure. It is also the easiest to fix: Allow corporations a good-faith defense
against criminal liability. Good faith defenses have been proposed before, but this is the
first proposal based on the expressive impact of the defense. A good faith defense will
limit the application of corporate criminal liability to those instances where there is a
basis to condemn the corporation as a whole, thus realigning the expression inherent in
criminal punishment with commonly held views about blaming corporations.

* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law. A.B., Stanford; J.D.,
Columbia. Thank you to the many people who have generously shared time and comments to make
this Article better than it otherwise would have been, including the participants at the Central States
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Colloquium. In particular, I’d like to thank Miriam Baer, Kara Bruce, Shelley Cavalieri, Ben Davis,
Jelani Exum, Peter Henning, Ken Kilbert, Susan Martyn, Steven Morrison, Ellen Podgor, Geoff Rapp,
Michael Rich, Bill Richman, Erin Sheley, Joe Slater, Larry Solum, Glen Staszewski, and Lee Strang. I
would also like to thank Dane Barca, Ian Kanig, Ramy Shweiky, and the entire staff of the Hastings
Law Journal for their outstanding work on this and the preceding Article, The Expressive Cost of
Corporate Immunity. Finally, I want to thank Beth Eisler, who taught me a great deal about teaching
and learning, and about being a student and being a teacher.
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Introduction
The last decade has been a turbulent one for large corporations. In
2002, Big Five accounting firm Arthur Anderson collapsed following its
1
conviction for obstruction of justice. It was the era of the Enron, Tyco,
Adelphia, and Worldcom scandals, to which Congress reacted with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), increasing accounting oversight and
2
corporate reporting requirements. Nearly five years ago, we entered the
3
4
global financial crisis. Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns collapsed, AIG
5
was rescued with $85 billion in credit from the Federal Reserve Bank, and
6
the United States became the majority owner of General Motors, giving a
7
literal truth to Charles Wilson’s famous quote. Congress reacted with the
8
Dodd-Frank Act, increasing regulation of financial institutions.
Beyond SOX and Dodd-Frank, this span of ten years brought
significant changes to the legal landscape confronting corporations. First,
there has been a dramatic increase in enforcement of the Foreign

1. See Flynn McRoberts, The Fall of Andersen, Chi. Trib., Sept. 1, 2002, at 1.1 (“[Arthur
Andersen’s] felony conviction for obstructing a federal investigation into Enron Corp., its nownotorious client, cost Andersen the heart of its practice. It will continue with a tiny fraction of the
85,000 employees it spread across the globe just months ago.”).
2. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 91, 94–95 (2007) (noting that Congress
responded by enacting SOX after fraudulent accounting practices were revealed at a number of major
corporations).
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1047 (2012) (“In 2008,
Congress saw the nation’s largest financial institutions race like lemmings over the cliff and into
insolvency.”).
4. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and
Lehman 2000–2008, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 257, 262 (2010) (“Bear Stearns was forced to sell itself to
JPMorgan in March 2008 for a per share price equal to about a quarter of the January 2000 stock
price. Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008.”).
5. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 943, 943–45 (2009) (“AIG
was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to be rescued by the United States government through an
$85 billion loan.”).
6. In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[Pursuant to its deal
with GM, the U.S. Department of] Treasury will own 60.8% of New GM’s common stock on an
undiluted basis. It also will own $2.1 billion of New GM Series A Preferred Stock.”).
7. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 83rd Cong. 1 (1953) (statement of
Charles E. Wilson, President, General Motors) (“I thought what was good for the country was good
for General Motors and vice versa.”).
8. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1020 (“The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010, followed an even
greater financial collapse [than that preceding the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley], one that threatened
financial institutions on a global scale and brought the problem of systemic risk to the attention of a
public already infuriated at financial institutions (and their highly compensated investment bankers)
being bailed out at taxpayer expense.”).
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9

Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). As a result of aggressive enforcement
and broad interpretation of jurisdictional requirements, nearly every
corporation that conducts business across national lines has potential
criminal exposure under the FCPA. And because the FCPA concerns even
10
relatively insignificant conduct, there are seemingly endless sources of
potential exposure for corporations.
Second, the Department of Justice increasingly relies on deferred
prosecutions agreements (“DPAs”) and non-prosecution agreements
11
(“NPAs”) to resolve criminal investigations. This development provides a
significant benefit to corporations that avoid being indicted and convicted,
but it also effectively lowers the burden for prosecutors seeking to charge a
corporation. Corporations have strong incentives to avoid indictment,
and some may be willing to settle matters through DPAs and NPAs that
they otherwise would have fought through trial.
12
Finally, whistleblower protections provided by SOX and bounties
13
provided by Dodd-Frank have increased corporate exposure to criminal
liability by generating a significant new source of information—the
14
corporate insider.
The full impact of these changes is not yet known. One obvious trend,
however, is that corporations will spend more money on compliance,
investigations, remedial actions and resolving prosecutions. While
corporations ought to be subject to criminal prosecution, the current state
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2011). See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the
Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 389, 389 (2010) (“[D]uring the past decade,
enforcement agencies resurrected the FCPA from near legal extinction.”).
10. By its terms, the FCPA applies to “an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of
value,” and does not contain a de minimis exception. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The statute does exempt
“reasonable and bona fide expenditure[s], such as travel and lodging expenses . . . directly related to—
(A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or
performance of a contract.” Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2). However, the scope of this exception is unclear, and
some companies have felt compelled to seek opinion releases from the Department of Justice before
spending relatively modest amounts on travel and meals. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Review: Opinion Procedure Release No. 07-01 (Dep’t of Justice July 24, 2007).
11. See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1417, 1432 (2009) (“Since the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002, the number of DPAs
and NPAs has increased substantially . . . .”).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
13. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 73, 74–75 (2012) (“In
Dodd-Frank, however, whistleblowers not only receive protection from termination or adverse
employment action but can also lay claim to financial bounties for bringing information to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that leads to successful securities enforcement actions.”).
14. “[S]ince the program was established in August 2011, about eight tips a day are flowing into
the SEC.” SEC Issues First Whistleblower Program Award, SEC News Dig., Aug. 21, 2012, at 1. While
the program is still young, as the SEC makes significant and well-publicized bounty payments,
awareness of and trust in the program is likely to increase, which should in turn generate higher
numbers of whistleblowers.
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of criminal prosecutions is problematic. The breadth of substantive
criminal laws, the extensiveness of prosecutorial discretion, the aversion to
risk on the part of corporations, and the heightened incentives to report
wrongdoing can result in seemingly arbitrary enforcement.
Facing these developments, some have begun to call for changes to
how and when corporations ought to be held criminally liable. The most
prominent of these proposals is that corporations ought to be afforded a
good faith defense to criminal liability. Presently, a corporation may be
held criminally liable for any act of any corporate agent performed in the
15
scope of agency and with the intent to benefit the corporation. A good
faith defense would limit this near-strict-liability standard of respondeat
16
superior. Academics have proposed the defense, practitioners have asked
17
courts to adopt something like the defense, and lobbyists have urged
18
Congress to enact the defense. The arguments offered in support of the
good faith defense have generally concentrated on questions of fairness to
the corporation, fairness to the law-abiding shareholders and employees of
the corporation, or efficacy of deterrence. This Article presents a new
rationale for the good faith defense: preserving the expressive efficacy of
the criminal justice system and the legitimacy of the legal system.
I have previously argued that the practice of holding corporations
criminally liable can only be justified by reference to the expressive aspect
19
of criminal sanctions. Deterrence is the primary goal of corporate
criminal liability, but deterrence can generally be achieved as effectively
15. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909).
16. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative
Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537 (2007) (presenting legal developments that further justify a good
faith defense); see also Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,
2012 Wisc. L. Rev. 609, 612 (2012) (“[A]n FCPA compliance defense will better incentivize more
robust corporate compliance, reduce improper conduct, and thus advance the FCPA’s objective of
reducing bribery. An FCPA compliance defense will also increase public confidence in FCPA
enforcement actions and allow the DOJ to better allocate its limited prosecutorial resources to cases
involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals who actually engaged in the improper
conduct.”); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605, 676 (1995) (“A
corporation should be able to defend against vicarious criminal liability by showing that it had a clear
and effective policy for complying with the law in place at the time of the violation, and that the
employee’s acts violated that policy.”).
17. See Brief for the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant
Urging Reversal, United States v. Ionia Mgmt., 526 F. Supp. 2d 319 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5081-CR)
(urging the Second Circuit to limit the principle of respondeat superior in determining corporate
criminal liability).
18. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 18–36 (2011) (statement of Michael
B. Mukasey, former U.S. Attorney General, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP).
19. See generally Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 Hastings
L.J. 1 (arguing that corporate criminal liability is best justified by reference to both deterrence and
expressivism).
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and less expensively by a regime of civil liability. Holding corporations
criminally liable can deter, but it is no better than holding them civilly
liable because, at least in theory, there is no criminal penalty that could
not also be imposed civilly. The justification for corporate criminal
liability is therefore found in its expressive benefits and in the expressive
costs of not subjecting corporations to criminal liability.
The problem is that corporate prosecutions often fail to serve a
positive expressive function and sometimes serve a negative expressive
function. As such, the practice of prosecuting corporations can undermine
the expressive reason for allowing corporations to be prosecuted in the
first place. In cases of what I call mere respondeat superior liability—
where there is no clear basis on which to condemn the corporation as a
whole for the wrongdoing—the application of criminal law is at odds
with widely held norms and results in a negative expression that is
harmful to the legal system as a whole.
This Article begins by identifying the value and potential costs of
expressivism. While the expressive aspect of punishment serves various
functions in a legal system, it can also undermine the perceived
legitimacy of a legal system. This relationship between legal expression
and perceived legitimacy is too often overlooked. Part I of this Article
identifies relationships between expression, perceived legitimacy, and the
acceptance of an obligation to obey the law by those subject to the law
(the internal view). It concludes that expressivism is causally related to
the perception of legitimacy and the internal view of law: This relation
makes positive expression—and the avoidance of negative expression—
important for the stability of the system. Whether the expression is
positive or negative depends on normative factors that influence how
legal expression is generated and understood. Certain procedural norms
are particularly important in this regard, and Part I concludes by
exploring those procedural norms.
Having identified the instrumental value of expressivism and
developed a basic understanding of how legal actions are expressively
understood, this Article turns to specific examples of corporate criminal
prosecutions. Part II presents two different corporate prosecutions and
identifies the expressive failures in each. The first, a case in which the
corporation was convicted after trial, demonstrates the expressive failure
of prosecuting corporations based on nothing more than respondeat
superior liability. The second, a civil resolution to a criminal investigation,
suffers from the same defect and also demonstrates other procedural
expressive failures. Part II concludes by assessing the relative impact of
negative expressions and by arguing that one negative expression in

20. Id. at 31–40.
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particular—mere respondeat superior liability—is the most detrimental
and the most easily remedied.
Part III briefly answers the well-founded, but ultimately misplaced,
objection that too few people are aware of specific legal actions like the
prosecution of a corporation for the expression to have a meaningful
impact.
Finally, Part IV reviews the viability of concrete proposals to fix the
respondeat superior standard of corporate liability, argues that a good
faith defense is tenable, and explores the impact such a defense would
have on corporate prosecutions and the expressive function of criminal
liability. This Article concludes that a good faith defense to corporate
criminal liability, while not devoid of problems, would remedy some
expressive failures associated with corporate prosecutions to the benefit
of the perception of legitimacy.
Corporations obviously dominate markets, but they also increasingly
21
dominate various parts of our legal system. For this reason, it is
particularly important that the legal governance of corporations not be
burdened with an expressive flaw. This Article suggests a path toward
expressive clarity in prosecuting corporations.

I. The Functional Significance of Expression
Criminal law is distinctively expressive. Violations of criminal law
result not only in hard treatment—prison, a fine, probation, et cetera—but
also reprobation. A person found to have violated a criminal law is subject
to a degree, and possibly a kind, of condemnation not present with civil
liability or regulatory infractions. This reprobation or condemnation that
accompanies punishment is the expressive aspect of criminal law (or at
least the dominant one).
The expressive function of the criminal law is entrenched but not
necessary. Indeed, as the distinction between criminal and civil laws
becomes less clear, the unique expressive aspect of the criminal law may
erode, and this would be a loss for the legal system. Expressivism in
criminal law has many benefits: It serves to reify societal norms, and it can
be used to shift societal norms. Additionally, expressivism serves as a tool
of punishment: A penalty of some identified hard treatment is generally
less severe than the same penalty accompanied by an expression of
condemnation.
The expressive aspect of criminal law also informs people’s
perception of legitimacy. People make judgments about a legal system’s

21. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 Buff.
L. Rev. 1369, 1398–404 (2006) (demonstrating the increased presence and influence of corporations in
the economy and the increasing role of corporations in the legal system).
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legitimacy based on what they perceive to be the expression inherent in
various legal actions. Perceived legitimacy matters, because when people
believe a legal system to be legitimate, they accept an obligation to comply
with the requirements of the legal system, and the system is accordingly
more stable and more efficient than it would be were it to rely on force
alone. How people perceive the expression in various legal actions,
however, depends on the norms of the perceiver. If we want to understand
the expressions people are likely to perceive in corporate prosecutions,
we need to know more about the norms that tend to inform judgments
about legal actions.
This Part first describes the relationship between expression, the
perceived legitimacy of a legal system, and the acceptance of an
obligation to comply with the law. It then identifies a set of norms that—
while not universal—are widely shared and helpful in assessing how
people are likely to perceive modern corporate prosecutions.
A. Expression, the Internal View, and Perceived Legitimacy
1.

The Internal View Distinguishes Law from Mere Power

There is a difference between the law and the bare assertion of
power. It is the difference between a gunman ordering a person to hand
over her purse under threat of death, and a legal system ordering a
person to pay taxes under threat of prison. This insight is the starting
22
point for H.L.A. Hart’s inquiry into the concept of law.
Hart defines the internal view as the acceptance of an obligation to
comply with authority for reasons other than fear of consequences for
23
failure to do so or mere habit. The fact that people subject to the law
24
adopt an internal view distinguishes the law from mere power. One
might impose rules on others and generate compliance through force and
threat of force alone; however, unless some people subject to the rules
adopt an internal view toward the rules, the assertion of power cannot be
25
considered law. The distinction is important because law has more
26
stability than the bare assertion of power. People will (sometimes) obey
22. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 6–7 (2d ed. 1994).
23. Id. at 56–57.
24. Id. at 202–03.
25. Id. at 203.
26. Hart’s inquiry into the concept of law should not be mistaken as a mere exercise in definition
or labeling. One could disagree that the assertion of power, where no one subject to that assertion
adopted an internal view, is not law. One might conclude that law includes even the mere assertion of
power. That conclusion strikes me as relatively inconsequential. It would still remain the case that
there is a meaningful difference between a command with which people comply only for fear of
consequences and a command with which people comply, at least in part, because they accept an
obligation to comply. This distinction seems like as good a place as any, and probably better than
others, to draw the line between law and not-law. But the label is not the point, the distinction is.
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laws even where there is no consequence for the failure to do so. Mere
27
power does not induce the same sort of obligation as law.
Of course, not all people subject to the law need to adopt the
internal view. Indeed, it will rarely, if ever, be the case that all people
28
subject to rules adopt an internal view of those rules. Some people will
disagree with the rules and the authority of the system to impose rules.
Others will perceive rules as inapplicable to themselves. Still others will
give no thought to a possible duty to follow the rules other than
recognizing the consequences of violating the rules and being detected.
The fact that not all people subject to a legal system adopt the internal
view does not render the legal system something less than law. Every
system will have dissenters and contrarians. The requirement is not that
every person subject to the rules adopt an internal view; it is that some
29
people subject to the rules adopt an internal view.
The stability of the legal system is directly related to how many
people adopt the internal view. A system in which very few people adopt
the internal view will be less stable than one in which all people adopt
the internal view because accepting an obligation to comply with the law
generates its own reason to comply with the law apart from fear of
30
sanctions. The dichotomy between law and mere force is a spectrum.
On one end of the spectrum, Hart’s threatening gunman asserts more
power. On the other end of the spectrum, the rules governing a small
village, where all the villagers accept an independent obligation to
comply with those rules, are law. Most legal systems will be somewhere
between these extremes, but the less a legal system is reliant on force and
the more it is supported by the internal view, the more efficient and
stable that system will be. The internal view promotes stability because
the accepted obligation to comply with the law is contrary to rebellion
against or disregard of the law. It enhances efficiency because the law can
rely, to some degree, on the accepted obligation to maintain compliance
rather than enforcement. A well-functioning legal system will cause
31
people to adopt the internal view.
27. See Hart, supra 22, at 82–83 (considering the example of a gunman, A, ordering another
person, B, to hand over money by threatening to shoot B if he does not comply, and concluding that it
would be misleading to say “B ‘had an obligation’ or a ‘duty’ to hand over the money”).
28. Id. at 201.
29. See id. at 202–03.
30. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 64 (2006) (“According to the Chicago study,
those who feel that they ‘ought’ to follow the dictates of authorities are more likely to do so.”). For
more on Tyler’s Chicago Study, see infra text accompanying notes 93–108.
31. As Hart described it:
If the system is fair and caters genuinely for the vital interests of all those from whom it
demands obedience, it may gain and retain the allegiance of most for most of the time, and
will accordingly be stable. On the other hand, it may be a narrow and exclusive system run
in the interests of the dominant group, and it may be made continually more repressive and
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The Internal View Can Be Caused by the Perception of
Legitimacy

Perceived legitimacy causes the internal view. By legitimacy, I mean
the fact that the legal system has a moral right to govern as it does.
People who perceive the legal system to be legitimate will adopt an
internal view toward the law because to believe a legal system has a
moral right to govern as it does is to accept an obligation to comply with
the requirements of that legal system.
32
All legal systems purport to be legitimate. Laws restrict the liberty
of the governed. Absent law, a person could kill, steal, or keep the fruits
of her labor without systemic interference; law limits these freedoms
33
systematically. By purporting to be legitimate, law seeks to distinguish
its authority from the mere assertion of power.
34
From a positivist perspective, a law may be evil and still be law.
There are, however, no legal systems that govern by purporting to be
evil. A gang conceivably might do that (although I am unaware of any
that do), and law-abiding members of society might say the gang was
using force, or coercion, or intimidation to maintain compliance with its
35
commands; but they would not call the gang’s power “law.” Legal
systems, whether good, or evil, or somewhere in between, will purport to
be legitimate. Plainly, therefore, purporting to be legitimate is different
than being legitimate.
The perception of legitimacy is also different than actual legitimacy.
Just as a legal system purporting to be legitimate bears no necessary
relation to its actual legitimacy, so too a person believing a law is
legitimate bears no necessary relation to its actual legitimacy. This
distinction between ways “legitimacy” is used is important. As Larry
Solum has warned: “[O]ne should be very wary about deploying the idea
of legitimacy. Because legitimacy has different senses and is

unstable with the latent threat of upheaval. Between these two extremes various
combinations of these attitudes toward law are to be found, often in the same individual.
See Hart, supra 22, at 202.
32. See Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and
Practical Reasoning 4 (2009) (“[G]iven that legal institutions purport to impose and enforce duties
on people, given that they take it upon themselves to deprive those who disregard their legally
imposed standards of property and liberty (and sometimes of their life), it follows that those
institutions take themselves to be legitimate, that is to have the moral right to act as they do (and that
individuals who occupy positions of power and responsibility within legal institutions believe, or make
it appear that they believe, that they do have such rights).”).
33. Of course, absent other law, other, less systematic forces could also limit these freedoms, the
most notable being the freedom of everyone else to kill, steal, or keep the fruits of their labor.
34. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
35. See Hart, supra note 22, at 82–83 (describing Hart’s example of a gunman demanding money
under threat of violence).
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undertheorized, it is very easy to make claims about legitimacy that are
36
ambiguous or theoretically unsound.”
Solum differentiates normative legitimacy (“making assertions about
37
some aspect of the rightness or wrongness of some action or institution”)
from sociological legitimacy (descriptive statements about the beliefs
38
people have about the legitimacy of an action or institution). The
question of normative legitimacy turns on whether a legal system has a
moral right to govern as it does. This Article does not address normative
legitimacy.
I take as a given that the relation between law and morality is
39
contingent, not necessary (that is, law can be understood without
40
reference to morality ). This positivist view is most prominently associated
41
42
43
with Kelson, Hart, and Raz, each of whom has written extensively on
the distinction between law and morality. This is not to say that morality
is not important to the positivist; morality is the primary basis on which
44
to form judgments about legal systems and laws. However, morality is
not a necessary element of law. A law can be immoral and nonetheless
45
be law, and a legal system can be evil and nonetheless be a legal system.
Brian Leiter has labeled this effort to distinguish between law and
morality the “Demarcation Problem,” presenting a fascinating argument
that the problem is unlikely to be solved and any solution would not
46
matter much anyway.
36. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Legitimacy, Legal Theory Blog (July 22,
2007, 5:31 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/07/legal-theory--4.html; see also Josh Bowers
& Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 211, 213 (2012) (“[L]egitimacy is a term
invoked so casually that it sometimes seems to signify little more than a vague aspiration.”).
37. Solum, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. See Raz, supra note 32, at 1 (“Theories of law tend to divide into those which think that, by its
very nature, the law successfully reconciles the duality of morality and power, and those which think
that its success in doing so is contingent . . . .”). Raz captures positivism as the view that “the content
of the law can be established without resort to moral considerations bearing on the desirability or
otherwise of any human conduct, or of having any particular legal standards.” Id. at 4.
40. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in Natural Law Theory 158–60
(Robert P. George ed., 1992) (“According to [the positivist conception of law], law can be understood
in terms of rules or standards whose authority derives from their provenance in some human source,
sociologically defined, and which can be identified as law in terms of that provenance. Thus statements
about what the law is . . . can be made without exercising moral or other evaluative judgment.”).
41. See generally Hans Kelson, Pure Theory of Law (1970).
42. See generally Hart, supra note 22.
43. See generally Raz, supra note 32.
44. See id. at 1 (“I have suggested that it is essential to the law that it recognizes that its use of
power is answerable to moral standards and claims to have reconciled power and morality. It may not
live up to its own aspirations.”).
45. See id. at 4 (“[L]egal standards can fail to be morally sound, indeed they can be evil . . . .”).
46. See Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in Jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism,
31 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 663, 664 (2011). The problem is unlikely to be solved, according to Leiter,
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This Article avoids the demarcation problem altogether by not
inquiring into the conditions necessary to be law; it instead inquires into
the conditions under which law functions well. The answer to the
function question is—in the abstract—fairly simple: Law functions better
when more people subject to the law perceive it as legitimate.
Accordingly, this Article relies on sociological legitimacy—or what I
refer to as perceived legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy matters because if
one perceives the legal system to be legitimate, one has reason to adopt
the internal view (that is, one has reason to accept an obligation to comply
with the commands of the legal system that she believes is legitimate).
It is true that one might accept an obligation to comply with the law
for reasons other than perceiving the legal system to be legitimate, but
these other reasons are less sturdy than believing in the legitimacy of the
legal system. For example, a person might accept such an obligation
because she was raised to believe that she should do so and she never
47
had occasion to question that belief. An obligation to comply premised
on this sort of uninformed habit is weaker than an internal view
predicated on a belief in the legitimacy of the legal system because it is
unsupported by reason. Similarly, one might accept an obligation to
comply with the law just because others appear to do so (that is, out of a
48
desire to conform). Unlike an obligation stemming from mere habit, the
obligation based on a desire to conform does provide a reason to maintain
the internal view. Assuming most people (or the people the subject wishes
to conform with) obey the law, then for a subject who desires to conform,
this desire and the behavior of others generate a reason to obey the law.
Indeed, conformity-based obligation is a powerful and important force in
maintaining stability of legal systems. After all, most people most of the
time probably do not reflect on the relative legitimacy of the legal system

because “[a]rtefact concepts, even simple ones like ‘chair,’ are notoriously resistant to analyses in
terms of their essential attributes.” Id. at 666–67. But even more interesting is the contention that we
do not really care about the solution. Leiter notes that the practical reason to solve the demarcation
problem is to determine what ought to be done in hard cases. Id. at 673. But solving the demarcation
problem—whether from the perspective of positivism or from natural law—will not inform what ought
to be done. Id. at 670. If moral validity is a necessary condition of law—the natural law view—and if
moral obligation is not defeasible, then an immoral legal command is not law and need not be obeyed.
Id. at 670–71. Likewise, however, if moral validity is not relevant to legal status—the positivist view—
and if moral obligation is not defeasible, then an immoral command is law and still need not be
obeyed. Id. at 676. The defeasibility or indefeasibility of moral obligations is the issue we care about,
and the resolution of the demarcation problem would not shed any light on that question. Id. at 675
(“The idea that a putative solution to the Demarcation Problem gives us the answer [to the question of
what ought to be done when the law and morality conflict] is an illusion.”).
47. See Hart, supra note 22, at 203 (“[T]heir allegiance to the system may be based on . . . an
unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude . . . .”).
48. See id. (“[T]heir allegiance to the system may be based on . . . the mere wish to do as others
do.”).
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that governs them; laws may often be obeyed just because others are
obeying the laws.
The limitation of an obligation predicated on the desire to conform
is that it is contingent on the circumstantial factor that others comply
with the law. Whereas a belief in the legitimacy of the legal system gives
a reason to comply with the law that is related to the substance of the
law, the desire to conform gives a reason to comply that is entirely
contingent on the behavior of others.
To see why the perception of legitimacy is important to a wellfunctioning legal system, at least over time, it is worth further examining
the difference between an internal view based on a desire to conform and
one based on the perception of legitimacy. Conformity might be
understood as the day-to-day rationale for the internal view. Legitimacy,
in turn, would be the deeper rationale that is less routinely consulted. As
such, legitimacy is particularly important at the extremes and in the long
term. In a new legal system, there is no history of people conforming
behavior to the command of that system, and the perception of
legitimacy is important. Likewise, in times of crisis—where people are
more likely to question the authority of the government—legitimacy is
essential. Finally, any extremes in the degree of perceived legitimacy will
also be important. Should a legal system appear particularly illegitimate,
that would cause more people to consider their reasons for maintaining
the internal view. Likewise, a particularly legitimate system (for example,
a system that is “fair and caters genuinely for the vital interests of all
49
those from whom it demands obedience” ) generates powerful support
for the internal view.
Similarly, over the long term, the perception of legitimacy is
important. Conformity works so long as most people conform, but it does
not really give an independent reason to obey. Over time, people will ask
questions about whether and why the law deserves their obedience.
Conformity will not answer these questions, but legitimacy (or the
perception of legitimacy) will. To the extent people believe the law is
legitimate, they have an independent reason to maintain the internal view.
It is worth noting that perceived legitimacy is defined purely as a
sociological fact. A legal system is perceived as legitimate so long as the
perceiver believes it has a moral right to govern as it does. The universe
of principles that can inform the perception of legitimacy is not limited.
One could believe a legal system is legitimate for any reason—good, bad,
50
or nonsensical. The perception of legitimacy, like the internal view, is
49. Id. at 202.
50. Someone may conclude the legal system is legitimate because it is the legal system that has
been in place for over two hundred years. Another may conclude it is illegitimate because it has not
yet been in place for at least five hundred years. Both of these are unusual views, but that fact does not
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merely a fact about a person’s beliefs. Accordingly, people may perceive
a legal system to be legitimate even if the substance of that legal system
51
were terribly unfair to many subjects. This is not a problem; it simply
reflects the thinness of the definition of perceived legitimacy.
3.

Legal Expression Affects the Perception of Legitimacy

“Expressivism” has been used to refer to many different ideas. I am
using the term to refer to a theory of punishment that recognizes that
punishment can only be properly understood in light of social values
52
regarding the wrongdoing, the conviction, and the penalty. This is a
53
relatively modest and uncontroversial claim. The fact that law has an
expressive aspect generates “the power of the law to marshal social
54
opprobrium,” and Mark Drumbl has suggested that this power can
55
serve to “strengthen faith in rule of law among the general public.”
Many scholars see this power as a beneficial consequence of a just
legal system and thus attribute the expressive value of law to the perceived
legitimacy of the law: Where the legal system is perceived as legitimate,
56
legal actions will have an expressive function that can influence behavior.
This formulation is correct, but it is also incomplete. The expressive
value of law can be positive or negative. A positive, or beneficial,
expressive value of law exists where the law is perceived as morally
legitimate. There can also be a negative, or harmful, expressive value of
57
law where the law is perceived as morally illegitimate.
As a positive force, expression leverages respect for the law—or the
law’s political capital qua law—to influence substantive beliefs about an

change that each person would have a view about the legitimacy of the legal system.
51. See Hart, supra note 22, at 200 (considering the example of slave-owning societies).
52. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 420
(1999) (“The expressive theory of punishment says we can’t identify criminal wrongdoing and
punishment independently of their social meanings.”).
53. Heidi Hurd has criticized a much stronger form of expressivism that purports to justify
punishment. See Heidi M. Hurd, Expressing Doubts About Expressivism, 2005 U. Chi. Legal F. 405, 417
(describing the “expressivist, who maintains that punishment is justified if and only if it properly
denounces or contradicts the social meaning of an offender’s actions”). I do not claim that the expressive
aspect of punishment justifies punishment; I claim only that the expressive aspect of punishment can and
does have consequences, most directly for the perceived legitimacy of the legal system.
54. Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 Geo. L.J.
1509, 1536 (2009).
55. Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 173 (2007).
56. See Starr, supra note 54, at 1537 (“[T]he expressive value of law turns on its perceived moral
legitimacy, without which it cannot effectively shape social norms.”).
57. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the Relationship
Between The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 145, 169 (2001) (“The message expressed by punishments, especially the moral message,
is likely to be shaped in large part by the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system.”).
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58

issue. Over time, if legal expressions of condemnation are decently
aligned with society’s values (that is, if the law tends to condemn conduct
that society independently condemns), then the law earns a sort of
59
expressive power to influence societal norms. As a negative force,
expression limits legal power; respect for the law is delicate, and should
the legal expression stray too far from strongly and widely held norms, it
risks undermining the perception of legitimacy and the internal view.
The theory that punishment has a distinctive expressive component is
60
most strongly associated with Joel Feinberg. Many scholars have
distinguished prices from punishments by the relation between the amount
61
of penalty and the harm caused. A price is meant to mirror the harm
caused, and thus serves to internalize that cost to the actor; a punishment
imposes significantly greater costs on the actor than the harm caused, and
62
thus serves to dissuade the action altogether. Feinberg adds to this
concept that the difference between punishment and pricing is not just one
of degree, but of kind. Actions that are priced are acceptable (if the price
is paid); actions that are punished are not acceptable (even if the
punishment is imposed). Therefore, when someone is punished, that

58. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 457
(1997) (“If [the criminal law] earns a reputation as a reliable statement of what the community, given
sufficient information and time to reflect, would perceive as condemnable, people are more likely to
defer to its commands as morally authoritative and as appropriate to follow in those borderline cases
in which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor.”).
59. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a PreferenceShaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.J. 1, 17 (1990) (identifying shaping preferences as an important, if
frequently ignored, purpose of criminal punishment); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries
and Federal Regulatory Crimes, 59 Hastings L.J. 137, 190 (2007) (referencing “campaigns to prosecute
‘dead-beat dads’ or drunk drivers” as examples of the use of criminal law to shift societal norms);
Robinson & Darley, supra note 58, at 457 (“[T]he criminal law’s most important real-world effect may
be its ability to assist in the building, shaping, and maintaining of . . . norms and moral principles.”).
60. See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 98
(1970) (identifying the “symbolic significance” and the “expression of attitudes of resentment and
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation” as distinctive aspects of punishment);
see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 404 (1958)
(“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”).
61. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1876 (1991); Robert Cooter, Prices
and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1523–24 (1984). But see Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil
Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 201, 204–05 (1996) (“[T]he prohibition-pricing
distinction . . . fail[s] to account for the wide range of substantive differences between [criminal law
and tort law].”).
62. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1876 (“The difference between a price and a sanction is at
bottom the difference between, on one hand, a tax that brings private and public costs into balance by
forcing the actor to internalize costs that the actor’s conduct imposes on others and, on the other, a
significantly discontinuous increase in the expected cost of the behavior that is intended to dissuade
the actor from engaging in the activity at all.”).
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punishment carries an expressive component—a judgment against the
person punished.
Feinberg specifically identifies the “reprobative symbolism of
63
punishment” as the necessary expressive value. Punishment is commonly
understood as the imposition of some hardship, or deprivation of a
privilege—what Feinberg labels the “hard treatment” aspect of
64
punishment. But hard treatment without some form of condemnation is
65
not punishment. For Feinberg, both hard treatment and reprobative
66
symbolism are required for something to be punishment. Thus, just as
hard treatment without condemnation is not punishment, so too
67
condemnation without hard treatment is not punishment.
But what really is this expression of condemnation? Legal systems,
such as they are, do not really communicate. Who would be speaking?
Would meaning be related to intention and, if so, whose intention? The
judge communicates in imposing a punishment, but in doing so she
speaks on behalf of, or as an element of, the legal system. It makes no
sense to think of a legal system, as a whole, communicating. How would
the legal system develop the intention to communicate?
The expression in punishment is best understood as a non-linguistic,
68
symbolic expression. It does not matter what is intended, or by whom;
someone observing the legal action of punishing will witness the
expression of reprobation. If she does not observe the expression of
reprobation, she will not identify the act as punishment (instead, it would
be something more like a fine, restitution, or remedy).
Joseph Raz touches on why we identify expressions in legal actions:
[T]he law makes certain claims for itself. Given that it is institutionalized,
in that its norms can be changed and applied by institutions, and given
that the institutions make certain statements and perform other speech

63. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 98.
64. Id.
65. Feinberg distinguishes “reprobation” from “resentment,” and uses “condemnation . . . as a
kind of fusing of resentment and reprobation.” Id. at 101 (emphasis omitted). By resentment, Feinberg
is referring to “the various vengeful attitudes,” and by reprobation, he refers to “the stern judgment of
disapproval.” Id. I am less confident that the vengeful attitudes, or resentment, have a role in a legal
system, and use the more general term, condemnation, to refer simply to reprobation, or “the stern
judgment of disapproval.” For a fascinating argument that vengeful attitudes do have a critical role in
a legal system, see Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 139–
52 (1997).
66. Feinberg, supra note 60, at 10i.
67. Id.
68. Matthew Adler argues that expressivists must be arguing that there is a linguistic meaning in
legal actions. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1363, 1384–85 (2000) (agreeing that legal actions have non-linguistic meanings, but suggesting
that expressivists generally argue for a specifically linguistic meaning). Joel Feinberg, however, seems
expressly to be describing a symbolic expression in punishment. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 98
(“Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”).
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acts in the course of their official actions, we can identify the
69
presuppositions of those statements and actions.

Raz is interested in presuppositions that actually and necessarily exist.
Thus, he considers the example of an institution purporting to grant a
particular right and concludes that the institution necessarily presupposes
70
it has the normative power to grant that right, in that way. When the law
imposes a punishment (understood as hard treatment and reprobation),
the institution presupposes that the person being punished should be
subject to reprobation. In this way, we can identify condemnation in the
punishment: Condemnation accompanies the hard treatment where that
hard treatment is labeled punishment. On the other hand, if someone
witnessing or learning of the hard treatment believes it carries no
reprobation, then he will not consider it punishment.
Bernard Harcourt notes that, as a descriptive matter, punishment
may also express values other than reprobation, like racial or political
values: “a message about who is in control and about who gets
71
controlled.” This makes sense: Why would the symbolism inherent in
meting out hard treatment to people be limited to reprobation? Imposing
punishment may express any number of values.
The variable content of expression in punishment is related to the
perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Where the law is not perceived
as legitimate, the other types of expression identified by Harcourt may
72
dominate. Punishment by what is perceived as an illegitimate authority
will not be understood as expressing moral condemnation; it may be
understood as expressing power, control, or will. Alternatively, it may be
understood as expressing something more specific. For example, if a legal
system disproportionately punishes black men for drug offenses, the
punishment of an individual black man for a drug offense may primarily
be understood—by one who questions the legitimacy of that legal
73
system—as an expression of racial subjugation.
Therefore, although moral opprobrium is not the only expression
generated by punishment, it is the archetypal one, and it ought to be the
dominant one. Moreover, moral opprobrium can be distinguished from
other forms of expression because it is the singular expression that must
accompany punishment; its presence is part of what makes the hard
treatment a punishment. Hard treatment that the law labels punishment
may in fact fail to convey reprobation and, indeed, it may convey entirely
69. Raz, supra note 32, at 2.
70. Id.
71. Harcourt, supra note 57, at 168.
72. Id. at 168 (“Punishment usually also communicates, importantly, political, cultural, racial and
ideological messages.”).
73. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness (2010).
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unrelated expressions about power or race or politics. However, conveying
reprobation is part of the function of punishment in a way none of these
other expressions are.
B. The Normative Values That Influence How Legal Expressions
Are Perceived
A legal system that is widely perceived as generating legitimate
expression will be more stable and well functioning, but people subject to
a legal system perceive legal expressions in accordance with their own
morals or normative stance. People’s norms matter to what expression
they perceive and whether they perceive the legal system as legitimate.
The calculation here is more nuanced than simply whether one agrees
with the outcome. A person who believes narcotics are harmful and
ought to be forbidden by the government may or may not identify
positive expression when a person convicted of selling narcotics is
sentenced to twenty years in prison for a repeat offense. Although the
sentence is the end result of a general policy with which he agrees
(criminalizing the sale of narcotics), he may disagree with the penalty
itself, finding it either too harsh or not severe enough. Likewise, someone
who believes the government has no role regulating what substances
people put in their bodies may or may not find the expression inherent in
the punishment legitimate. Though she disagrees with the general policy
that results in the sentence, she may believe that the democratic process
by which the penalty was established is a higher good than the liberty she
would like to have preserved. Moreover, she may believe that all
legitimately enacted and sufficiently publicized criminal laws ought to be
obeyed, and that the defendant’s failure to obey the drug laws—laws she
substantively disagrees with—merits condemnation. The perception of
legitimacy depends on alignment with moral values, but those moral
values may relate to matters beyond the substance of the law at issue.
What norms affect views about legitimacy? The simplest answer is
that any and all norms can. Any normative view held by any person
subject to a legal system may be part of how that person assesses the legal
74
system. Given the plurality of moral perspectives in most societies, there
75
is unlikely ever to be consensus as to the legitimacy of the legal system. A
person assessing legal actions and evaluating the legitimacy of those
74. Michael Walzer develops this idea more thoroughly, and more broadly than I need to, when
he argues that “it is the meaning of goods that determines their movement.” Michael Walzer,
Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 8 (1983). “All distributions [of all goods]
are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake.” Id. at 9. As this Article is
concerned with perceived, or sociological, legitimacy, my contention more modest than Walzer’s: The
distribution of punishment will be perceived as just or unjust relative to the social meanings attached
to the punishment.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.
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actions will do so according to her own normative values. By way of
example, consider the range of possible reactions to the imposition of a
$1000 criminal fine (and no other penalty) on a person found guilty of
insider trading by which he profited $1000. An advocate for unfettered
markets might see this as an unjustified deprivation of wealth from a
person who earned access to superior information. A believer in modern
securities regulations might see this as an inadequate deterrent for failing
to account for the ex ante possibility of avoiding detection. Both views
would be critical of the legal action, and each would perceive negative
expression in the legal action, but those perceived expressions would be
entirely different. The person who believed any penalty to be wrong
might perceive expressions offensive to liberty and supportive of an
undesirable positive equality. The person who believed the penalty
inadequate might perceive the opposite: expressions offensive to equality
and supportive of an undesirable negative liberty. More simply, the former
would perceive legal condemnation of morally acceptable conduct; the
latter would perceive tacit legal acceptance of morally condemnable
conduct. Our normative values will determine how we interpret legal
actions; expression in law is thus contingent on normative values.
At this point, one could be forgiven for asking: What’s the use of this
model if perceived legitimacy is determined by the set of all norms that
exist among all people subject to a legal system? Given the breadth of
possibility inherent in the fact that any normative view will influence the
assessment of legitimacy for the person who holds it, I suggest that what
ought to interest us is not every moral view, but rather those that are
shared by many people. Insofar as the purpose of the inquiry is to assess
76
the stability and efficiency of the legal system, what matters is having
77
more people perceive the system as more legitimate. There is no more
stable and efficient legal system than one in which all subjects perceive the
law as maximally legitimate. From there it is a sliding scale of decreasing
stability and efficiency, as fewer people perceive the law as maximally
legitimate, and as more people perceive the law as less legitimate.
1.

Substantive Norms and Procedural Norms

Normative values that inform people’s perception of the legal
system can be divided into substantive norms and procedural norms. In
this Subpart, I argue that procedural norms matter more than substantive

76. As opposed to making a deontological claim about what Solum has labeled normative
legitimacy. See supra text accompanying note 37.
77. Well, not quite. This is an oversimplification. What probably matters in practice is not merely
having more people perceive greater legitimacy, but having more of the right people perceive greater
legitimacy (i.e., to account for the fact that in any group some individuals have disproportionate
influence on the thinking of others). For purposes of this Article, I ignore this nuance.
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norms to people’s assessment of legitimacy, and look to the work of Tom
Tyler to identify widely shared procedural norms.
Substantive norms are those related to the conduct regulated by law.
For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) makes it a
78
crime to bribe foreign government officials. One might—independent
of the law—believe it is wrong to bribe foreign government officials.
Alternatively, one might see nothing wrong with bribing government
officials in other countries. Both views are substantive value judgments
about the conduct regulated by the FCPA. The former is aligned with the
law and the latter is not. Whether one takes one of these views—or some
other more nuanced view about the moral value of bribing foreign
79
officials —will influence how one perceives prosecutions and punishments
of those who violate the FCPA.
Alignment of substantive norms with the specific prohibitions of
criminal law will obviously influence how people perceive prosecutions,
but it will not generally explain the adoption of the internal view. This is
perhaps counter-intuitive; after all, is not the primary criterion for
whether one believes a law to be legitimate actually whether one
normatively agrees with the purpose and function of the law? Probably
not. In fact, were this the primary criterion for perceived legitimacy,
complex modern legal systems would enjoy very little perception of
legitimacy. The substantive normative scope of a legal system is simply too
broad, diverse, and normatively inconsistent to satisfy many people in
terms of agreement with the substantive norms promoted by the system.
80
81
The federal criminal law addresses issues as diverse as speech, firearms,
82
83
84
85
86
narcotics, taxes, water hyacinths, family obligations, odious motives,

78. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
79. For example, Andrew Spalding has argued that FCPA enforcement may not have the salutary
effect on corruption sought by its supporters. Noting that increased FCPA enforcement of business in
developing countries has the effect of reducing foreign direct investment in that country, see Andrew
B. Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism and China’s New Laissez
Faire, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 354, 405 (2011) (summarizing empirical studies and concluding that the
“latest empirical data suggests that antibribery legislation has a deterrent effect on investment in
countries where bribery is perceived to be more prevalent”), Spalding suggests that the reduction of
foreign direct investment by companies from countries with progressive anti-bribery legislation and
enforcement threatens to limit constructive engagement, leaving a vacuum quickly occupied by more
opportunistic nations, less concerned with the impact of bribery. Id. at 406–10. Therefore, according to
Spalding, more aggressive FCPA enforcement could lead to more, not less, corruption.
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2011) (“Statements or entries generally”).
81. See, e.g., id. § 922 (“Unlawful acts [of firearm possession]”).
82. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2011) (“Prohibited acts [of drug trafficking and manufacture]”).
83. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2011) (“Attempt to evade or defeat tax”).
84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 46 (“Transportation of water hyacinths”).
85. See, e.g., id. § 228 (“Failure to pay legal child support obligations”).
86. See, e.g., id. § 249 (“Hate crimes acts”).
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90

associations, gambling, obscenity, commercial competition, loyalty to
91
92
country, and democracy. This is only a limited selection from the broad
scope of federal criminal law, and yet the likelihood of any one person
agreeing with each of these laws is low. Moreover, consider that “agreeing
with each of these laws” entails not only the relatively simple question of
whether the type of conduct ought to be permitted or not, but also the
more nuanced matters such as drawing lines between legitimate and
illegitimate conduct and identifying the appropriate penalty for violations.
The fact is, people in a complex legal system will be accustomed to
disagreeing with the substance of the law, but substantive disagreement
does not undermine the perceived legitimacy of a legal system until it
becomes a very strong and important substantive disagreement.
As Tom Tyler writes, describing these substantive norms as
“personal morality”: “Unlike legitimacy, personal morality is doubleedged. It may accord with the dictates of authorities and as a result help
to promote compliance with the law, but on the other hand it may lead to
93
resisting the law and legal authorities.”
Where the dictates of authorities become too contrary to one’s
personal morality (on matters that are sufficiently important), the
substance of those dictates will undermine the perception of legitimacy.
Most of the time, however, people are willing to accept as legitimate laws
of which they substantively disapprove.
Perceived legitimacy is therefore mostly influenced by procedural
94
norms. Procedural norms concern the fairness—or lack thereof—of
legal procedures. Tyler has extensively studied procedural norms,
specifically considering the relationships between people’s experience
with the legal system, their attitudes toward the legal system and their
95
relative compliance with laws. The first thing to note about procedural
96
norms is that, like substantive norms, they are neither universal nor
97
absolute. Nonetheless, Tyler conducted extensive surveys of 1575

87. See, e.g., id. § 521 (“Criminal street gangs”).
88. See, e.g., id. § 1084 (“Transmission of wagering information; penalties”).
89. See, e.g., id. § 1461 (“Mailing obscene or crime-inciting matter”).
90. See, e.g., id. § 1832 (“Theft of trade secrets”).
91. See, e.g., id. § 2339A (“Providing material support to terrorists”).
92. See, e.g., id. § 201 (“Bribery of public officials and witnesses”).
93. Tyler, supra note 30, at 26.
94. See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 661, 663 (2007) (“[P]eople are
more interested in how fairly their case is handled than they are in whether they win . . . . [N]umerous
studies conducted over the last several decades have consistently found this to be true.”).
95. See Tyler, supra note 30.
96. See id. at 156 (“[T]he meaning of procedural justice changes in response to the nature of
people’s experiences with legal authorities.”).
97. See id. (“[I]ndividuals do not have a single schema of fair procedure to apply in all situations.”).
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randomly selected people in Chicago to get data on attitudes toward the
legal system, including views on procedural justice and behavior relative
98
to the legal system. Of the 1575 people surveyed, a “randomly selected
99
subset of 804 respondents was reinterviewed one year later.” The data
were analyzed for the full set of respondents to understand “the
relationship between attitudes and behavior measured at one point in
time,” while the subset of 804 respondents interviewed twice was
analyzed “to examine the relationship between changes in attitudes and
100
changes in behavior.”
Tyler concludes that procedural norms matter a great deal to
101
assessments of legitimacy. Moreover, he was able to identify “different
aspects of procedure [that] independently influenced judgments about
102
whether the procedure was fair,” including:
they had an opportunity to
 “a belief on the part of those involved that
103
take part in the decision-making process”

 “judgments about the neutrality of the decision-making process”
 judgments about whether the decisionmakers are “honest and105. . . reach
104

their decisions based on objective information about the case”

 “being treated politely”
107
 “inferences about the motives of the authorities”
108
 “whether the procedures produce fair outcomes.”
Tyler’s approach is more detailed and nuanced than necessary for this
Article: For example, the distinction between a decisionmaker’s neutrality,
honesty, and motives are fine ones, and they may be difficult to parse in
practice. But generally the results suggest tremendous practical utility.
Tyler’s study gives us a set of criteria that are widely shared and that will
tend to reflect on the fairness of a procedure. In the next Subpart, I
106

98. Id. at 8.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 107 (“The results of the Chicago study support the finding of earlier research that
procedural justice is generally important [to perceptions of legitimacy].”). Tyler further found that
procedural justice was more important when the experience assessed involved courts (as opposed to
police), was in dispute, was voluntary, or had an unfavorable outcome; for experiences involving
police, no dispute, involuntary contact, or favorable outcomes, procedural justice still mattered, but to
a lesser degree. See id. at 105.
102. Id. at 163.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 163–64.
105. Id. at 164.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. This is a particularly interesting factor in that it is a sort of hybrid between the substantive,
outcome-based norms and the procedural-based norms. Still, “[f]air outcomes are one thing that
people expect from a fair procedure, and a procedure that consistently produces unfair outcomes will
eventually be viewed as unfair itself.” Id.

Gilchrist_21 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

5/24/2013 4:41 PM

EXPRESSIVE FAILURE OF CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS

1143

consider how these criteria reflect on the current practice of prosecuting
corporations.
2.

Normative Values That Inform Perceptions of Corporate
Prosecutions

Corporate prosecutions will be assessed against applicable substantive
109
and procedural norms. In the first instance, for any alleged criminal act,
there will be substantive norms about that act itself. These types of norms
were addressed above by considering the example of bribing foreign
110
officials in violation of the FCPA. Some people will morally disapprove
of the conduct that is the basis for the criminal charge, and others will
not. These norms can be widely divergent without necessarily disrupting
111
the internal view of law.
112
As addressed above, procedural norms tend to dominate legitimacy
assessments. Whether people perceive as fair the processes by which
corporations are prosecuted, charged, convicted, and punished will
influence their view of the legitimacy of prosecuting corporations
113
generally. Of the values identified by Tyler and listed above, all would
seem relevant to how corporate prosecutions are perceived except,
perhaps, the concept of being treated politely (because it is unclear what it
114
means to treat a corporation politely). The other values, however, do
seem applicable to corporate prosecutions and will be considered in Part II
in assessing how well the current practice of prosecuting corporations
serves its expressive purpose.

II. Two Examples of Corporate Prosecutions as Expressive
Failures
Corporate prosecutions generate a number of expressions, including
most simply that corporations—just like individuals—are forbidden from
115
engaging in criminal conduct. Certain prosecutions, however, risk
generating negative expressions that can undermine the perceived

109. See supra Part I.B.1.
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2011).
111. See Tyler, supra note 30, at 235 n.11 (“Research on the American political system has found
that in general people have at least some reservoir of goodwill toward legal and political authorities,
even if they are marginal members of society.”).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 94–108.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 103–108.
114. Of course, corporations act through real persons, even in their dealings with prosecutors, and
politeness will matter to the people involved in those meetings. However, the public has little or no
opportunity to observe the interaction between corporate representatives and law enforcement officials.
Accordingly, the degree of politeness in these interactions is unlikely to influence perceptions of
legitimacy (except, perhaps, for those few attorneys or corporate employees privy to the interaction).
115. See generally Gilchrist, supra note 19.
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legitimacy of the legal system. In this Part, I consider two corporate
prosecutions that have generated negative expression. Each failed, in
different ways, to serve the expressive purpose that justifies holding
corporations criminally liable in the first place, and neither is atypical. I did
not select these cases because they are particularly noteworthy; rather, I
selected them because they illustrate fairly common problems with
corporate prosecutions. Both involve prosecutions of parent corporations
for the actions of employees of subsidiaries. Beyond that, however, the
prosecutions are quite different. One resulted in a trial and conviction of
the corporation, the other in a civil resolution. Both illustrate particular
problems with modern corporate prosecutions failing to align with the
116
widely shared procedural norms identified in the preceding Subparts.
A. The Prosecution and Conviction of AML, Inc.
1.

The Prosecution

Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (“AML”) was a Miami-based
117
corporation that owned and operated a number of medical businesses.
Among these business were “eight commercial plasmapheresis centers”
118
engaged in the collection and sale of plasma. One of those centers was
separately incorporated as Richmond Plasma Corporation (“RPC”), a
119
wholly owned subsidiary of AML. As with most medical businesses, the
120
collection and sale of plasma is heavily regulated. Following regulatory
difficulties in 1977 and 1978, AML created “a special office for the specific
purpose of assuring compliance with federal regulations at AML plasma
121
122
centers.” Hugo Partucci was designated to run this compliance office.
Partucci was employed by yet another wholly owned AML subsidiary, and
he had worked since 1972 serving as the head of a number of different
123
AML-owned plasmapheresis centers. Notably, prior to being assigned to
run the new compliance office, “Partucci was responsible for assuring
124
compliance at RPC and at least two other plasma centers.”

116. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
117. United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 401 (4th Cir. 1985).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 400–01.
120. Id. at 400 n.1 (“Such facilities must register with and be licensed by the FDA. They are also
required by Federal regulation to maintain extensive records regarding a variety of matters such as
donor screening, equipment testing, and the collection, storage and disposition of plasma. The FDA is
authorized to inspect plasmapheresis facilities and their records to ensure compliance with applicable
regulations.”).
121. Id. at 401.
122. Id. at 400–01.
123. Id. at 401.
124. Id.
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By late 1978, Partucci, accompanied by a few lower-level employees,
had begun “periodic inspection at various AML centers to discover and
125
correct any deficiencies in compliance with FDA regulations.” Finding
numerous regulatory deficiencies, particularly at RPC, compliance team
members began instructing employees “to falsify and fabricate records to
126
127
conceal these deficiencies.” They did so at Partucci’s instruction.
Partucci was the highest level employee alleged to have any involvement
in the fraudulent activity.
AML was convicted, and on appeal it argued that “the Government
failed to prove the ‘element’ that its agents’ criminal acts were undertaken
128
primarily to benefit AML.” Moreover, AML had specific policies
forbidding the exact conduct engaged in by Partucci and other lower-level
employees; therefore, AML argued, the conduct was outside the scope of
129
their employment. The Fourth Circuit had little difficulty rejecting
these arguments. The corporate policy argument was dismissed on the
130
basis of prior precedent. The Fourth Circuit was no more moved by the
argument that there was insufficient evidence of intent to benefit AML.
The court opined that “it would seem clear” Partucci’s actions were
undertaken, at least in part, with intent to benefit AML, and noted that
“it is not necessary for an agent’s actions to have actually benefited the
131
corporate entity.”
2.

The Expressive Problem: Mere Respondeat Superior Liability

The AML case is interesting because it demonstrates how little is
required for a corporation to be vicariously liable for the acts of its
employees. The court’s analysis appears to be correct. AML was
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 406.
129. Id. at 407 (“[M]any of their actions were unlawful and contrary to corporate policy . . . .”).
130. Id. at 406 (“[A] corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations
committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority, or apparent
authority, and for the benefit of the corporation even if . . . such acts were against corporate policy or
express instructions.” (quoting United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983))).
131. Id. at 407 (citing Oil Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945)). This is not
an unusual or surprising rule. Were corporations immune unless the crime redounded to their actual
benefit, corporations would almost never be criminally liable. After all, the issue arises only when the
perpetrators are caught; the calculus is thus inherently skewed away from actual benefit because of the
inclusion of the costs of detection, investigation, defense, and criminal penalties. See United States v.
Ionia Mgmt., 526 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 (D. Conn. 2007) (quoting J.C.B. Super Mkts, Inc. v. United
States, 530 F.2d 1119, 1122 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The suggestion that the employee’s wrongful act did not
advance the interests of the employer and therefore should not be imputed to it entirely overlooks the
basic concept of respondeat superior. Presumably no tortious act by an agent redounds to the benefit
of the principal where the latter is held responsible for the damage which results. Yet if this reasoning
were followed no principal would ever be liable.”).
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challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal following conviction.
The question for the appellate court, accordingly, was only whether “the
jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
132
doubt.” Given that it was possible that Partucci’s fraud would inure to
the benefit of AML, it would not be unreasonable for a juror to conclude
133
that he intended it to be so. That conviction, however, tells us nothing
about the degree to which AML itself should be condemned for the crime.
Prior to the compliance inspections that led to fabricating records,
134
Partucci was responsible for compliance with regulations at RCL.
Therefore, according to the appellate record, Partucci was responsible
both for the regulatory failings that led to the cover-up and for the coverup itself. Was the cover-up to protect AML or to protect Partucci?
The most obvious reason for Partucci to engage in a cover-up was to
protect himself. It is entirely possible that no part of Partucci’s conduct
was to benefit AML—it was to save his own hide. The Fourth Circuit did
note that the intent to benefit rule would serve “to insulate the corporation
from criminal liability for actions of its agents which be inimical to the
interests of the corporation or which may have been undertaken solely to
advance the interests of that agent or of a party other than the
135
corporation.” The court avoided this possibility by concentrating on the
question of the scope of authority: “AML had specifically assigned to these
individuals the responsibility for assuring compliance by its plasmapheresis
centers with FDA regulations. In instructing other employees regarding
compliance with applicable regulations, Partucci and the others were
acting within the scope of their authority or certainly within their apparent
136
authority.”
AML assigned Partucci to ensure compliance; by ordering fabrication
and falsification of records, Partucci was—in a criminal and expressly
forbidden manner—ensuring compliance. Had he not been caught, the
cover-up presumably would have benefitted AML (because it would not
have been subject to regulatory sanctions for non-compliance). That
rationale was sufficient for the Fourth Circuit to conclude that it was clear
137
Partucci acted to benefit AML.

132. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984).
133. For example, personnel other than Partucci were involved in the falsification and fabrication.
Perhaps the involvement of multiple employees convinced jurors that the conduct was done to benefit
AML, not to protect Partucci. Moreover, the conduct continued after Partucci left the company, and
this also could suggest that the conduct was not to protect Partucci (although, the continuation of
fabrication and falsification seems just as likely explained by employees, having engaged in initial
falsehoods, protecting themselves by continuing the falsehoods to avoid detection).
134. See Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 401.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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We might blame AML for negligence in selecting Partucci to run
138
RCL and selecting him to head the compliance review. But even that is
probably a stretch. We have no information about whether or how AML
conducted diligence on Partucci and his ability and integrity. We do not
know if Partucci lied to AML to get these positions; we do not know if
AML complied with or even exceeded the industry standard in vetting
Partucci. We cannot really say, with the benefit of hindsight, much more
than that AML choose poorly in hiring and appointing Partucci. But that
is neither a controversial statement nor a helpful one: Senior officers at
AML would almost surely agree, regardless of whether they share any
blame in the wrongdoing.
One might question whether an entity can, in any reasonable sense,
139
be blamed. In The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, I wrote that
140
Simply put,
corporations deserve neither blame nor fairness.
corporations do not deserve blame or fairness because they lack the
141
capacities necessary for moral desert. They can, nevertheless, be blamed.
Whereas desert is a distinctive moral concept strongly associated with
blame, blame is sociological fact: One can blame or not blame—the reason
or lack of reason for blaming does not change the fact of blaming. That
said, blame can be silly or unreasonable, or it can be based in something
sensible. Attribution of fault to a tree branch that falls on me can be real,
though probably not reasonable. Attribution of fault to a corporation can
be both real and reasonable because corporations—largely through their
142
reporting structures, and incentive plans—influence the
cultures,
143
behavior of employees and agents. Furthermore, in certain cases, the
138. Whether negligence is condemnable is a subject of lengthy and complex debate. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 149–57 (2009) (arguing that the carelessness that
caused one to be unaware of the risk is a basis for culpability and thus negligence may be punished);
Joseph Raz, Responsibility and the Negligence Standard, 30 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 16 (2010)
(identifying a set of omissions avoidable but for a malfunction of rational capacities as negligence for
which one can properly be held responsible). But see Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing
the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 Crim. L. & Phil.
147, 165 (2011) (arguing that not all negligence is the result of unexercised capacity and thus
blameworthy). I do not address this (exceedingly difficult) issue in this Article.
139. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations,
46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1392 (2009) (arguing that blaming and punishing corporations is puerile).
140. See generally Gilchrist, supra note 19.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 151–157.
142. Ian B. Lee, Corporate Criminal Responsibility as Team Member Responsibility, 31 Oxford J.
Legal Stud. 755, 772 (2011) (describing corporations as teams and identifying positive and negative
cultural values promoted by teams).
143. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473, 491
(2006) (“Institutions influence people in ways that sometimes make it rational to blame institutions for
what people do.”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487, 493 n.16 (2003) (“[M]anagement’s commitment to corporate ethics,
organizational culture, and institutional incentive structure have been determined to significantly
influence the level of organizational misconduct.”); see also Gilchrist, supra note 19, at 9–14.
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failure to establish any clear culture on a particular topic (e.g., a
corporation’s failure to communicate to its agents and employees the value
of compliance with environmental regulations) might be seen as an
omission on the part of the corporation that negatively influenced (or
failed to properly influence) an individual agent.
I previously introduced the example of Corporations Alpha and
Beta, which had very different cultures regarding foreign bribery and
144
corruption. Corporation Alpha had a strong culture of compliance with
U.S. law, including the FCPA, that included vigorous training and
145
appropriate incentives to encourage compliance with the law.
Corporation Beta not only lacked that culture, but it also had a reporting
and pay structure that clearly increased the risk people would violate the
146
FCPA in order to benefit themselves within the corporation. A culture
of compliance is no guarantee of full compliance, so it remains possible
that an employee of Alpha could violate the FCPA. However, were that
to happen, people would likely be less condemning of Corporation
Alpha (as a whole), than they would of Corporation Beta if one of its
employees violated the same law in the same manner. Corporation
Alpha was structured to avoid the wrongdoing; Corporation Beta was
structured in a way that facilitated the wrongdoing. The latter is more
147
likely to be condemned (although both could be held criminally liable).
In a case like AML, where there is no apparent reason to blame the
company, the special expressive function of criminal sanctions is inactive at
best. The prosecution against AML illustrates the extent to which the
doctrine of respondeat superior can permit criminal liability that is entirely
detached from meaningful culpability. Mere respondeat superior liability
(that is, cases in which the acts of a single or few relatively low-level
employees give rise to liability) can generate prosecutions unaccompanied
by any meaningful condemnation of the corporation. While people might
condemn the corporation if the corporate culture fostered an environment
148
in which the law was more likely to be violated, a corporation can be
149
criminally liable without this cultural element. In such a case, there is
144. See Gilchrist, supra note 19, at 11–14 (explaining the Corporations Alpha and Beta example).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
148. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1503, 1532
(2007) (“Companies can develop distinctive cultures (or an ethos) including values that are contrary to
general norms, which they encourage their employees to flout.”); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A
Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1123 (1991) (“Much of the
voluminous business literature on corporate culture is premised on the notion that organizations have
distinctive cultures.”); see also Gilchrist, supra note 19, pt. I (explaining why corporate culture is relevant
to the degree of condemnation toward a corporation whose agents violate the law).
149. See N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 494 (“[I]mputing [the corporate agent’s] act to his employer and
imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises [can help control an
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little or no reason to condemn the corporation qua corporation, and the
criminal law is being used without any expressive aspect. Sara Beale points
out that a safety valve exists:
In practical terms . . . the consequences of the respondeat superior
doctrine are substantially mitigated by the Department of Justice’s
prosecutorial guidelines, which instruct federal prosecutors to consider
factors that correlate with corporate fault, such as whether the
wrongdoing in question was pervasive within the corporation, whether
the corporation had a history of similar conduct, and whether the
corporation had in place an active compliance program that was
150
implemented in an effective manner.

While Beale is right to note that guidelines and prosecutorial discretion
limit the application of respondeat superior liability, such liability
nonetheless remains the rule, and the AML prosecution demonstrates
that, at least sometimes, corporations are prosecuted for mere respondeat
superior liability.
Where a legal system purports to “punish” a corporation by imposing
hard treatment and the perceiver fails to see a reason to condemn the
corporation, there is dissonance between the legal act and its expression.
The legal system is saying this is punishment (that is, hard treatment plus
reprobation), but the perceiver sees no reprobation because there is no
basis for condemnation. People are unlikely to blame just because
151
something is called punishment.
This expressive dissonance might be resolved in a number of ways,
and none of them are good for the perceived legitimacy of the legal
system. First, people might begin to discount the law’s assessment of
what merits condemnation (that is, the law claims to be condemning this
non-blameworthy person; therefore, I reject the law’s assessment of what
is blameworthy). A legal system that blames the non-blameworthy will
152
be deemed less legitimate. It is, to return to Tyler’s criteria, resorting to
153
procedures that do not produce fair outcomes.
Second, people might come to believe that no condemnation
accompanies the hard treatment and, accordingly, that the hard treatment
154
is more like a fine than a punishment as defined by Feinberg. At first,
this alternative might seem better for maintaining the perceived legitimacy
agent].”).
150. Beale, supra note 148, at 1516–17 (footnotes omitted).
151. That is, except at the margins, where the perceived legitimacy of the law is strong and
independent norms about the subject of the punishment are weak. It is in these cases that the expressive
power of the law can be harnessed to shift societal norms.
152. Tyler, supra note 30, at 172 (“If people have an experience not characterized by fair
procedures, their later compliance with the law will be based less strongly on the legitimacy of legal
authorities. Therefore, not experiencing fair procedures undermines legitimacy.”).
153. Id. at 164.
154. See Feinberg, supra note 60, at 96.
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of the legal system because it does not involve a dissonance between the
apparent intent of the law and the beliefs of the perceiver (i.e., the
perceiver fails to identify any effort by the law to condemn, and this is
consistent with her belief that there is no basis to condemn; rather, a
redistributive, remedial, or incenting fine or tax is being imposed).
However, failure to recognize condemnation in a criminal penalty has a
different cost: It dilutes the meaning of criminal penalties. Where the
criminal process is used to impose hard treatment devoid of reprobative
value, the association between criminal sanction and reprobation is
undermined because it is no longer the case that the imposition of criminal
liability is something special, reserved for those whose action merits
155
condemnation.
None of which is to suggest that there is not good reason to penalize
AML; after all, AML is in the best position to prevent this sort of
wrongdoing, and imposing a penalty will incentivize AML and similarly
situated companies to use more care in appointing, training, and
supervising compliance personnel. The FDA cannot actively monitor or
audit every required record for every company. There must be
consequences for companies that violate the regulations to induce
companies subject to the regulations to apply resources toward
compliance. Yet this straightforward deterrence can be achieved just as
well, and more efficiently, through civil remedies without undermining the
perceived legitimacy of the legal system or the expressive value of criminal
156
law.
By imposing a criminal penalty on a company that people feel is not
blameworthy, the legal system will either undermine its own legitimacy
as people discount the law’s commitment to fairness, or it will undermine
the expressive function of criminal sanction as people dissociate criminal
157
liability from blameworthiness. AML serves as an example of this risk.
155. John Coffee expressed this concern two decades ago, writing about the encroachment of
substantive criminal law into matters traditionally left to civil law:
[T]he criminal law should not be overused. This position stems not only from the usual fairness
considerations, but also from a sense (at least on my part) that overuse will impair the criminal
law’s nondeterrent functions. Recent scholarship has emphasized the criminal law’s socializing
role as a system for moral education. In similar terms, economists have viewed the criminal law
as an instrument for shaping preferences as well as for imposing costs. This “preferenceshaping” role posits that the criminal law can and should affect not simply the rational actor’s
perception of the costs of crime, but also the actor’s perception of the benefits from crime. To
perform this role, however, the criminal law’s scope must be limited because society’s capacity
to focus censure and blame is among its scarcest resources.
Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877 (footnotes omitted).
156. See Gilchrist, supra note 19, at 41 n.237 (citing Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Criminal
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1532 (1996)).
157. I should add a few caveats here. First, it is possible—as a result of publicity or gossip around
Miami—that the public had access to additional information (whether or not true) about AML that
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B. The Prosecution of and Settlement with Johnson & Johnson, Inc.
1.

The Prosecution

Pharmaceutical and medical device giant Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”)
158
recently was prosecuted for violations of the FCPA. The resolution of
the investigation demonstrates another set of expressive problems that can
and do arise from corporate prosecutions.
On April 8, 2011, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed with the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia a DPA it had entered
159
into with J&J. The agreement resolved the DOJ’s investigation of J&J
160
The
and its subsidiaries for numerous violations of the FCPA.
investigation concerned illegal payments to foreign officials through the
United Nations Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq, in addition to payments in
161
Greece, Poland, and Romania.
Pursuant to the agreement, the DOJ filed a criminal information
charging J&J subsidiary DePuy, Inc. with “conspiracy to commit an
offense against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, that is, to
162
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.” J&J admitted that it
was responsible for the acts violating the law as specified in the agreement,
163
including those committed by its subsidiaries, and agreed to pay a
164
monetary penalty of $21,400,000. J&J also agreed to extensive auditing
165
and reporting requirements to the DOJ. In exchange, the DOJ agreed
that if J&J complied with all its obligations under the agreement, after a
period of three years the agreement would expire, the DOJ would
dismiss with prejudice the information against DePuy, and the DOJ
would pursue no further action against J&J or any of its subsidiaries for
166
conduct covered by the agreement.

made it very comfortable with blaming the company. In that case, the expressive harms identified in
this Part would not result; this Part is meant to demonstrate how respondeat superior can undermine
perceived legitimacy, not to claim it invariably does so. Second, an expressive failure does not cripple a
legal system. There will be expressive failures that cannot be remedied. I address some of these below.
See infra Part II.C. The standard cannot be perfect expressive coherence, but perfect expressive
coherence is the aspiration, and where there is an expressive failure that can be remedied, it ought to
be. Finally, and related to the second point, one might question whether people really even notice
these details. See infra Part III.
158. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012).
159. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of Justice and J&J (Jan. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Johnson & Johnson DPA].
160. Id. ¶ 2.a; id. at Attach. A.
161. Id. at Attach. A ¶¶ 1–101.
162. Id. ¶ 2.
163. Id. ¶ 2.a.
164. Id. ¶ 6.e.
165. Id. ¶ 11.
166. Id. ¶ 12.
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In addition, the agreement specifically noted: “Were the Department
to initiate a prosecution of J&J or one of its operating companies and
obtain a conviction, instead of entering into this Agreement to defer
prosecution, J&J could be subject to exclusion from participation in
167
federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a).”
Section 1320a-7(a) provided that conviction for the charged violations
would result in exclusion from participation in all federal health care
168
programs. Excluding a pharmaceutical and medical device company like
J&J from Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal programs would have a
catastrophic effect on the company, and might even give cause to fear for
169
future viability.
The agreement also stated: “J&J had a pre-existing compliance and
ethics program that was effective and the majority of problematic
operations globally resulted from insufficient implementation of the J&J
170
compliance and ethics program in acquired companies.”
2.

The Expressive Problem: An Effective Compliance Program
and the Use of Criminal Law to Penalize Negligence
171

What expression was made through this prosecution of J&J? One
positive expression is that FCPA violations will be aggressively investigated
and prosecuted. The Statement of Facts included in the agreement
describes real and persistent corruption. Over a period of eight years in
Greece, DePuy paid over $16 million to agents, “knowing that a significant
portion was used to pay cash incentives to publicly-employed Greek
172
[healthcare providers] to induce the purchase of DePuy products.”
Equally troubling, senior executives at DePuy ordered changes to the way
payments were made in an effort to cover up what they knew to be
173
174
wrongful conduct. Other subsidiaries made additional illegal payments.
167. Id. ¶ 4.j.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2012).
169. See, e.g., Dan Levine, Health Giant to Plead Case in D.C., The Recorder, Dec. 3, 2009, at 1
(“A felony conviction against Johnson & Johnson would lead to a big fine, but it would have
enormous consequences beyond that. Under federal regulations, it would mean automatic exclusion
from Medicare and Medicaid, which would be catastrophic for the company and would also deny
millions of patients the range of drugs it offers.”); see also John Ashcroft et al., Whistleblowers Cash in,
Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 367, 374 (2011) (“[D]ebarment in federal programs
[can be a] corporate life-threatening event for firms with a high percentage of government business
such as defense contractors, medical device manufacturers, and pharmaceutical companies . . . .”).
170. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶ 4.k.v.
171. In this Subpart, I am considering exclusively the prosecution of the parent company, Johnson
& Johnson. The prosecution of DePuy, the subsidiary of J&J, does not present the same issues.
172. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, at Attach. A ¶ 71.
173. See id. at Attach. A ¶ 40 (describing an email from the Vice President of Finance to another
senior executive recommending methods of payment that would “pass the red face test”); see also id.
at Attach A. ¶ 45 (describing an email from the Vice President of Finance admonishing participants in
the payment scheme for creating a written record of cash incentives “which cannot be mentioned in
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That this conduct was investigated and prosecuted criminally at all
expresses a commitment to exposing and punishing foreign bribery.
There are, however, a few other expressions that people might take
from the prosecution. Although the wrongful conduct occurred almost
175
exclusively within subsidiaries owned by J&J, J&J itself was also
176
prosecuted. The prosecution threatened J&J not merely with the
possibility of a conviction, but with the potentially existential threat of
177
Moreover, the DOJ
exclusion from federal healthcare programs.
178
conceded that J&J had a pre-existing and effective compliance program.
There is, therefore, an expression that while an effective compliance
program can mitigate loss, it will not prevent prosecution.
More broadly, in light of the effective compliance program and the
general lack of involvement by J&J employees outside of the named
subsidiaries, there is an expression—similar to that criticized in the AML
179
prosecution —that prosecutions are not tied to relative culpability.
Some corporations will have strong, positive, ethical cultures that
180
influence individual agents favorably, like Corporation Alpha. Others
will lack this culture, or even promote a negative culture (for instance,
favoring short-term gains at any cost) and influence individual agents
181
negatively, like Corporation Beta. But an individual corporate agent
might violate the law at either type of corporation. Malfeasance is less
likely at the corporation with a strong, positive culture, but cultures are
merely influences: they do not define or circumscribe behavior.
J&J, according to the agreement and accompanying Statement of
Facts, is more like the hypothetical Corporation Alpha than Corporation
182
Beta: For the most part the corporation worked as society wants
183
corporations to work, but things went wrong anyway.
J&J did agree that “the majority of the problematic operations
globally resulted from insufficient implementation of the J&J compliance

written correspondence with DePuy International”).
174. See Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, at Attach. A ¶¶ 72–119.
175. After DePuy was acquired by J&J, the “senior executive in charge of DePuy at the time”
became a senior executive at J&J, but he retained control of DePuy. Id. at Attach. A ¶ 17. There is no
allegation that any other J&J personnel were involved in the wrongdoing. Indeed, in the one identified
instance in which a J&J employee other than the DePuy executive learned of problematic conduct by
an agent, the relationship with the agent was terminated within two months. Id. at Attach. A ¶¶ 31–32.
176. See id. ¶¶ 1, 6.d, 11.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 167–169.
178. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶ 4.k.v.
179. See supra Part II.A.2.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 144–147.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 144–147.
182. See supra text accompanying note 144.
183. This is evidenced by DOJ’s concession that J&J had a pre-existing compliance program that
was effective. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶ 4.k.v.
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and ethics program in acquired companies,” and that this failure rests
184
squarely with J&J. Still, J&J’s failure to sufficiently implement a
compliance program in every new acquisition across a global company is
quite different from—and less serious than—failures such as maintaining a
culture that facilitated the wrongdoing or involvement of senior personnel
in the wrongdoing. Failure to fully implement a compliance program
quickly enough to prevent harm might merit condemnation if there was an
indication that the compliance program was not fully implemented
because the parent company knew that doing so would undermine the
(illicit) profitability of subsidiaries. There is no allegation to that effect in
J&J’s case. Rather, the gist of the agreement is that J&J was a generally
good corporate citizen that negligently failed to properly control a few of
its subsidiaries. It may make sense to penalize J&J for that negligence; it
makes less sense to bring the opprobrium of criminal justice upon the
185
company.
The expression of condemnation inherent in criminal liability is
inconsistent with the position that this was an accident of oversight. Failure
of oversight is negligent, and there are good reasons to penalize it; but
invoking the expressively distinctive criminal law to do so risks the
expressive dissonance that can undermine legitimacy or the evisceration
186
of expression in criminal law that can undermine efficacy.
Here, it is worth noting a limitation to my conclusion. One might
ask why we cannot sufficiently condemn a company for negligence such
that criminal liability is expressively appropriate. The resolution of that
issue is related to my conclusions: If criminal sanctions ought only apply
where there is a basis to condemn the defendant, whether there is a basis
to condemn the defendant for mere negligence will determine whether
criminal sanctions ought to apply in instances of mere negligence. I have
largely assumed that corporations ought not to be subjected to criminal
187
liability for mere negligence. As noted above, I have intentionally sidestepped the issue of whether criminal liability is ever appropriate in cases
188
of mere negligence (that is, a single instance of negligence). I did so for
184. Id.
185. See supra note 138.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 152–157.
187. By “mere negligence” I am speaking about criminal acts so attenuated from the corporation
as a whole that to attribute them to the corporation doesn’t quite “fit.” This analysis, admittedly,
involves a sort of personification of the corporation and attribution of mental states that, of course, are
not actually applicable. Corporations qua corporations cannot really be said to be unreasonably
unaware of an unjustifiable risk because corporations qua corporations lack awareness. Indeed, the
DePuy personnel who authorized and paid bribes were agents of J&J. Accordingly, their knowledge
might be attributed to J&J, and one might say J&J was actually aware of the wrongdoing. But this
analysis begs the question; after all, whether we attribute that knowledge to J&J turns on whether we
think J&J ought to be responsible.
188. See supra note 138.
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two reasons: First, as a theoretical matter, this is a challenging question
that merits its own article. Second, in most cases, negligence nets less
condemnation than more direct wrongdoing—that is, there is generally a
difference in the degree of condemnation for negligence and that for more
direct misconduct. To apply criminal liability to corporate shortcomings
like the failure to conduct diligence beyond that normally due risks
189
diluting the expressive power of criminal sanctions. On the other hand,
whereas a single act of negligence does not elicit the degree of opprobrium
typically associated with criminal sanctions, a pattern of negligence might.
Patterns of negligence that can be attributed to a corporate culture,
however, do not qualify as “mere negligence,” and may be the basis for
190
criminal liability.
3.

Another Possible Expressive Problem: DPA and the
Appearance of Coercion

Another concern about the J&J resolution is that it generates the
appearance of coercion. After all, J&J agreed to pay approximately
$21 million in civil penalties and to accept monitoring after being
threatened with potentially company-jeopardizing exclusion from
191
government programs. For some companies, just the prospect of
indictment is a significant threat. The indictment itself can have a dramatic
192
impact on share price or even the ability of the corporation to continue
193
business as usual. For J&J, the possibility of being excluded from
federal health care programs is an additional threat of even greater
magnitude. Threats like these—especially where they are memorialized
in the settlement agreement—could suggest the resolution was
194
effectively coerced.
189. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877 (“[O]veruse [of criminal law] will impair the criminal law’s
nondeterrent functions . . . .”).
190. See infra Part IV.
191. Johnson & Johnson DPA, supra note 159, ¶¶ 6, 11.
192. See Rapp, supra note 2, at 119–20 (noting that news of corporate fraud may result in a
decrease in stock price “completely out of proportion to the ‘fundamental news’ that a disclosure
conveys”); see also Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159, 160 n.7 (2008) (“For public companies,
the share price is usually immediately affected [upon an indictment becoming public].”).
193. See Interview with David Pitofsky, Partner, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, New York, Corp.
Crime Rep., Nov. 28, 2005 (“It may be that the market responds differently to criminal investigations and
convictions than it used to, but upon the announcement of a criminal investigation, companies regularly
lose half of their market value. If the price remains depressed long enough, the capital markets dry up, the
ability to hire quality people dries up. The company’s oxygen supply is cut off.”).
194. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 86–87 (2007) (“[S]o long as
there is a hint of criminality by even a single lowly employee, the corporation’s counsel has no
leverage and no bargaining power. Only the prosecutor can be merciful, and for his mercy the
corporation rationally chooses to cooperate in any way demanded.”); Andrew Weissman & David
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A coercive process, even without looking to the substance of
allegations and resolution, would cause observers to question the fairness
195
of the outcome, simply because the process would suggest the outcome
had more to do with risk assessment and risk tolerance that it did with
196
the underlying fact of guilt or innocence. Were the process to appear
coercive, the damage to the legitimacy and expressive efficacy of the
legal system would be severe.
C. The Variable Significance of Expressive Concerns
The prosecutions of AML and J&J demonstrate at least two kinds
of potential negative expression. There is the appearance of unfairness
where criminal liability is applied to a non-blameworthy entity; both
AML and J&J generate this problem to some degree. Additionally, J&J
demonstrates the risks of more straightforward procedural unfairness.
The appearance of a coerced resolution is incompatible with a fair process.
In this Subpart, I suggest that the former is a far more serious problem in
corporate prosecutions than the latter. While coerced resolutions would
have an even more detrimental effect on legitimacy and expressive efficacy
than blaming the non-blameworthy, there is less reason to worry about
coercion in corporate prosecutions than about misapplication of criminal
liability.
197
The coercion point can be overstated when it comes to corporations.
Corporations do fear indictment, but they do not simply roll over at the
198
mention of possible criminal penalties. It is not the case that corporations
199
never proceed to trial: They do.
Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411, 426 (2007) (“[A] corporation has
little choice but to accede to the government’s demands.”).
195. Tyler, supra note 30, at 164. This is a particularly interesting factor in that it is a sort of hybrid
between the substantive, outcome-based norms and the procedural-based norms. Still, “[f]air
outcomes are one thing that people expect from a fair procedure, and a procedure that consistently
produces unfair outcomes will eventually be viewed as unfair itself.” Id.
196. See Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game,
85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 77, 77–78 (2010) (“[O]ur existing legal system places the risk of going to trial,
and in some cases even being charged with a crime, so high, that innocence and guilt no longer become
the real considerations.”).
197. Indeed, Sara Sun Beale aptly points out that coercive process is hardly unique to corporate
prosecutions, and may even be a more significant problem in other kinds of cases. Beale, supra note
148, at 1523–29. I have previously addressed the risks of coercion in non-corporate cases. See Gregory
M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 143 (2011).
198. As Peter Henning writes:
The demise of Arthur Andersen after its conviction in 2002 for obstruction of justice is often
used to “prove” the purported overwhelming power of prosecutors and the trembling fear
of corporations who dare not risk going to trial under any circumstances lest they face nearcertain destruction. However, there have been no other instances of a large firm suffering
the same fate since then, even though other companies that have been charged with crimes
and appear to have survived the ordeal, albeit quite a bit worse for wear.
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Prosecutors wield significant power negotiating the resolution of
corporate criminal prosecutions, but a brief review of Siemens’ resolution
of a multi-year investigation of foreign bribery suggests corporations are
hardly helpless. The Siemens example is good because the wrongdoing was
200
extensive and well established. If companies ever lack the ability to
negotiate, Siemens during its FCPA investigation would be a decent
example.
But here is what happened: In 2008, the DOJ announced that it had
resolved its investigation of Siemens for violations of the FCPA with “the
largest monetary sanction ever imposed in an FCPA case since the act was
201
passed by Congress in 1977.” Siemens incurred fines to the DOJ, the
Securities Exchange Commission and German authorities totaling about
202
$1.6 billion. This is a very large sum, of course, but it was imposed to
penalize a “pattern of bribery . . . unprecedented in scale and geographic
reach . . . . involv[ing] more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government
203
officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the Americas.”
Because these bribes affected “thousands of contracts over many years,”
the DOJ conceded it could not calculate the amount Siemens profited
204
from the bribes.
For purposes of applying the sentencing guidelines, the government
205
and Siemens agreed on an estimated loss amount of $805.5 million. But
this is surely a woefully inadequate figure. Siemens paid over $1.4 billion
in bribes that affected thousands of contracts. It is inconceivable Siemens
engaged in the largest bribery scheme ever detected because it lost
money doing so. If Siemens paid $1.4 billion in bribes, it is almost certain
Siemens earned more than $1.4 billion in contracts as a result. Moreover,
unless there was an exceedingly low profit margin on the bribes, Siemens
earned more than $1.6 billion, the total amount it was fined, as a result of
its crimes. Yet the total benefits of bribery likely exceed even these direct
benefits. For example, the benefit of earning a single contract can extend
far beyond the value of the contract simply by establishing relationships,
Henning, supra note 11, at 1418–19.
199. Id. at 1419 (citing, by way of example, W.R. Grace & Co. taking an environmental case to
trial and winning).
200. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines
(Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html (“Today’s filings make
clear that for much of its operations across the globe, bribery was nothing less than standard operating
procedure for Siemens . . . .”).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Department’s Sentencing Memorandum at 13, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaf,
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf.
205. Id.
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trust, and goodwill that can influence future contracts. Barring an
inconceivably ill-managed and self-defeating course of conduct, Siemens’
crime—even after accounting for the largest fine in the history of FCPA
206
enforcement—almost surely paid. That it did so is a tribute, at least in
part, to Siemens’ ability to negotiate, notwithstanding the credible threat
207
of indictment wielded by prosecutors.
The appearance of coercion is always a concern, and it raises real
risks of undermining legitimacy that vary dramatically from basic norms
208
about procedural fairness. However, there are probably more reasons to
worry about the appearance of coercion with prosecutions of individuals
209
than of corporations. As Beale argues, individual defendants—who
waive all trial rights and plead guilty at a rate greater than 95%, face
additional risks such as mandatory minimum sentences, might lack the
resources to hire retained counsel, and are often incarcerated pre-trial—
present at least as great (and almost certainly more troubling) an
appearance of coercion than does a major corporation resolving a criminal
210
investigation through a civil fine.
Even if one concludes there is some appearance of coercion in the
way criminal investigations are resolved, not every expressive cost can be
eliminated. The resolution of criminal investigations through civil fines is
an example of a legal action with some expressive cost that is, all things
considered, worth the cost. Consider the alternatives. Putting aside the
constitutional concerns with requiring prosecutors to pursue criminal
211
resolution to criminal investigations, the outcome would be impractical
206. Mark Mendelsohn, then-Deputy Fraud Section Chief, has argued against this claim citing to
collateral consequences such as the cost of the investigation, a $100 million World Bank fine, and the
expense of replacing its board of directors. See Skip Kaltenheuser, Anti-Corruption—US Leads the
Way, Int’l Bar News (Feb. 2010), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=21F61C450318-41F6-89F8-3E8C01EC57B1. This argument strikes me as unpersuasive both because it still fails
to identify enough additional costs to make clear that Siemens’ conduct did not benefit the company in
the long run, and also because the costs of defense and remedial actions are never considered part of
the punishment in other contexts.
207. Mike Koehler suggests another factor that likely added to Siemens’ leverage:
Siemens is a major U.S. government contractor and its diverse business units have contracts
with a wide range of U.S. government agencies, including Department of Defense,
Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Department of Transportation,
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Energy, Department of
Commerce, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the General Services
Administration. The DOJ stated specifically in its sentencing memorandum that it chose to
resolve the Siemens matter the way it did to avoid “collateral consequences” that could
have resulted from criminal FCPA anti-bribery charges including the “risk of debarment
and exclusion from government contracts.”
Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 Geo. J. Int’l. L. 907, 996 (2010) (footnote omitted).
208. See supra Part II.B.3.
209. See Podgor, supra note 196 (giving examples of individuals charged with white collar crimes).
210. Beale, supra note 148, at 1525–29.
211. See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that
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and undesirable. Under such a rule, a prosecutor would be required,
upon investigating a company for potential criminal wrongdoing, to
resolve the matter either with a declination or a prosecution. This would
result in less deterrence of wrongful conduct, if only because of the
resource restraints on proceeding to trial on every matter. Similarly, any
rule forbidding prosecutors from mentioning the possibility of debarment
or exclusion would be inconsequential, at best. If there is a risk of
debarment or exclusion, it is in the company’s interest to know that and,
in all but the most outlandish cases, the company will know that. That is
why corporations employ lawyers. Accordingly, to the extent that the
possibility of exclusion or debarment drives a settlement, it would do so
whether or not the prosecutor mentioned it.
Therefore, on the one hand, although there may be some expressive
cost to the way in which settlements are negotiated—as suggested by the
J&J prosecution—the cost is highly susceptible to being overstated, and
the possible remedies appear even less desirable. On the other hand, the
cost of imposing criminal liability absent blameworthiness, as in cases of
mere respondeat superior liability, generates a rather plain expressive
cost and little benefit that could not as well be achieved by other means
without the expressive cost. In Part IV, I address revisions to the corporate
liability standard that could fix this problem. First, however, I consider a
possible objection to the reality of expressive costs.

III. Do People Really Notice?
How many people are really aware of the way in which the J&J
settlement was secured? How many people even know whether it is a
criminal or civil resolution? How many people care?
The answer is, probably not many.
So does any of this matter? If people don’t know about the details of
these prosecutions, does it matter how they are secured?
People observe legal actions as expressions by the legal system.
Punishment without basis for condemnation generates an expressive
dissonance (that is, the legal system is expressing condemnation while the
observer sees no basis to condemn). This dissonance must be resolved, and
the resolution entails either harm to the legitimacy of the legal system or
harm to the expressive efficacy of criminal law.
But if there is no observer, then none of this matters. Unseen legal
actions have no functional expression.
Still, it does matter how these prosecutions are carried out. It is true
that with any one prosecution, few people will be aware of the sort of
details that would be likely to influence perceptions about the legitimacy
the decision to investigate or prosecute an offense rests with the prosecutor).
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of the process. However, the fact that the audience is small should not give
leave to ignore basic principles of fairness altogether. Over time,
expressively negative conduct will have a cumulative impact on
perceptions of the legal system. Perhaps in one case that influence applies
to a few officers and employees of a corporation, and maybe outside
counsel and a few family members, but in the sum of cases even this
limited awareness of negative expression in the legal system will grow.
This does-it-really-matter question raises a related issue: How big of
a problem is the expressive dissonance in corporate prosecutions? Beale
argues that the disconnect between the perception of blameworthiness
and the application of criminal law is not unique to corporate criminal
212
liability; rather, it is endemic to our legal system. For example, in many
jurisdictions the limited scope of the insanity defense will permit
convictions of defendants in cases where all parties agree the defendant
213
lacked the capacity to control his conduct as result of mental disease.
She also gives the examples of accomplice liability and strict- or nearstrict-liability weapons and immigration offenses as cases where criminal
214
law applies notwithstanding the absence of a reason to condemn.
Beale is plainly correct that the problem of expressive dissonance is
not unique to corporate criminal law—it exists elsewhere. She further
concludes that, given the relative paucity of corporate prosecutions and the
less severe consequences faced by convicted corporations when compared
to individuals, flaws in the corporate criminal law present less urgency than
the issues of insanity, accomplice liability, and strict liability or status
215
offenses.
I am sympathetic to this assessment, and yet maintain that corporate
criminal liability presents an especially significant expressive problem
because of the role of corporations in our society and legal system. Marc
Galanter presents a compelling overview of the expanding role of
216
corporations in society. He marshals evidence that the corporate sphere
has grown, the legal sphere has grown, and the corporate influence over
212. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 1482, 1488 (2009).
213. Id. at 1488–89. This is particularly interesting in light of Michael Moore’s work identifying
necessary capacities for desert through application of the insanity defense. See Moore, supra note 65,
at 595. Moore’s approach, which strikes me as a good one, is to take the insanity defense as a baseline
for lacking desert, and from that identify the capacities the insane lack that are necessary for desert.
Id.; see also Gilchrist, supra note 19, pt. II.B.1; Beale’s observation suggests that while insanity may
remain a fair baseline for lack of desert, the absence of legal insanity—even without another excuse—
does not imply desert.
214. Beale, supra note 212, at 1489.
215. Id. at 1490 (“[I]f we have to triage, and give priority to only a few of these issues, neither the
number of cases nor the severity of the sanctions would place corporate criminal liability at the top of
my list for reform.”).
216. Galanter, supra note 21, at 1375–87.
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217

the legal sphere has also grown. Corporations consume ever-increasing
legal resources and, as frequent and repeat participants in legal actions,
218
corporations play a significant role defining the substance of the law.
This importance of corporations to our legal system is difficult to
overstate. Legal expressions in corporate prosecutions may, therefore,
generate disproportionate impact compared to legal expressions in
individual prosecutions. To be sure, this is not always the case.
Furthermore, Beale’s point about the sheer numbers remains correct—
there is simply a lot more expression through prosecutions of individuals
than through prosecution of corporations. But the expression in
corporation prosecutions may be particularly pronounced simply because
the outsized presence—legal, financial, and social—of the corporate
defendant.
There is, however, another concern about whether corporations
deserve blame: What if there is a widespread anti-corporate sentiment that
all corporations deserve blame, even where we cannot identify the normal
hallmarks of blameworthiness such as culture, policies, or leadership
involvement? If enough people sufficiently dislike corporations, would
they not perceive a legal system that attacks corporations even absent the
indicia of blame as more, rather than less, legitimate? Put differently,
could a widespread and strong anti-corporate sentiment cause people to
perceive legitimacy in condemning corporations even where there is not an
immediate basis to do so? Perhaps there is not a good reason to blame J&J
for something beyond negligence for the failures at the recently acquired
DePuy, but were enough people sufficiently anti-corporate, they might see
a basis to blame large corporations simply because they are large
corporations. As such, the legal system that prosecutes more large
corporations would be perceived as more legitimate, without regard for
whether there is a reason to blame the corporation in the particular
instance.
While there is at least a significant minority of the population that
219
holds strongly negative views of large corporations, I will cautiously say
that—although I do not have empirical support for this position—I think
the condemnation of corporations though prosecutions without regard
for culpability would inure to the detriment of the perception of
217. Id. at 1387–98.
218. Id. at 1389 (“Two recent studies of federal court litigation suggest that organizational litigants
win more frequently and lose less often than do individuals.”). In a system reliant on precedent and
stare decisis, frequent wins amount to more favorable law.
219. See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, 185 Arrested on Occupy Wall St. Anniversary, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17,
2012, 8:00 am), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/protests-near-stock-exchange-on-occupywall-st-anniversary (describing the arrest of 185 people at the New York Stock Exchange during a protest
against an “unfair economic system that benefited the rich and corporations at the expense of ordinary
citizens”).
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legitimacy. Criminal law exists to systemically punish wrongful conduct.
The use of criminal law to attack the unpopular—even if said use is
popular in the short run—is not sustainable. While indiscriminate
prosecution of corporations might be popular in the short run during a
time of widespread anger against corporations, it is so contrary to the
rule of law that it would be bound, at least over time, to undermine the
perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Mob rule might be popular, but
it remains mob rule and unlikely to be confused with legitimate law.
Therefore, even if there were widespread anti-corporate sentiment, and
even if unprincipled anti-corporate prosecutions were popular, these
corporations would be unlikely to increase the perception of legitimacy
220
and would probably, over time, decrease that perception.
A legal system that acts to generate expressions consistent with
widely held norms will be better functioning and more stable than one that
does not do so. Therefore, where avoidable expressive dissonance is
identified, it ought to be eliminated, unless the cost of doing so is too great.
In this case, as I argue in the next Part, the remedy seems relatively simple.

IV. Limiting Corporate Criminal Liability
The AML and J&J prosecutions suggest that a respondeat superior
standard for criminal liability is too broad. In both cases, the
corporations were subject to criminal prosecution absent a reason to
221
blame the corporation qua corporation. People blame corporations when
corporations, through policies, culture, or leadership, influenced the
222
wrongdoing. To limit the costs to legitimacy and expression described
223
above, criminal liability should attach to corporations only where
corporate policies or culture influenced the wrongdoing.
This proposal is not easy to implement in practice. Pamela Bucy has
proposed a corporate ethos standard of liability, pursuant to which a
corporation would be criminal liable only where “there exists a corporate
224
ethos that encouraged the particular criminal conduct at issue.” This
seems both correct and impractical. Bucy acknowledges the challenges
posed in implementing the standard and presents a thorough defense of

220. Again, I do not have empirical support for this conclusion (hence, I offer it cautiously). While
the conclusion makes sense to me, this might be an area for further empirical research.
221. As noted above, in each case there may be reason to blame the corporation for omissions
(e.g., failure to conduct more due diligence or failure to quickly implement compliance programs after
acquiring a company). But that is a lesser sort of blame than is typically associated with criminal
sanctions. See supra text accompanying notes 187–190.
222. See Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost, supra note 19, at 9–14; see also supra text accompanying
notes 144–179.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 152–155.
224. Bucy, supra note 148, at 1128.
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225

the standard in the face of those challenges. Still, as Samuel Buell
concludes, “[i]t is extremely difficult to see what trial and appellate
226
review of enterprise cases would look like under such legal rules.” No
one has presented a functioning model for a culture- or policy-based
standard of corporate liability.
A. Precluding Liability Where There Was an Effective Compliance
Program
A more manageable standard would be to preclude criminal liability
227
for corporations that have an effective compliance program. Such a rule
could be implemented by adding “an additional element to criminal
liability that requires the prosecution to prove that a corporation lacks
‘effective policies and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by
228
their employees.’” Alternatively, it could be implemented with an
229
affirmative good faith defense. If companies were only held liable where
it could be proven that the company lacked effective policies to prevent
the wrongdoing, there would be a basis to blame the company. The
expressive failures identified in this Article would be, for the most part,
avoided.
One potential problem with the good faith defense is that a standard
of “effective policies and procedures” would need to be established.
There are models for such a standard. Both the U.S. Sentencing
230
231
identify aspects of
Guidelines and the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
effective compliance programs. Section 9-28.000 of the U.S. Attorneys’
Manual provides guidelines for prosecution of business entities and
includes the existence of an effective compliance program among the
relevant factors.
The Manual notes that “the Department recognizes that no
compliance program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a
corporation’s employees,” and that it “has no formulaic requirements
232
regarding corporate compliance programs.” These are important points:
225. Id. at 1176–82.
226. Buell, supra note 143, at 528.
227. The Chamber of Commerce has been lobbying to implement such a rule in specific legislation.
See Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Restoring
Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 11 (2010) (urging
implementation of a compliance defense to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et
seq.).
228. Brief for the Ass’n of Corporate Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant
Urging Reversal, supra note 17, at 23 (quoting Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking
Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 Ind. L.J. 411 (2007)).
229. See supra note 16.
230. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1 (2011).
231. See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.800 (2008).
232. See id.
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Efficacy in compliance will vary by industry, organizational structure, size,
and many other factors, just as do the elements of efficacy for business
success. Accordingly, the DOJ eschews a singular compliance formula,
opting instead to identify factors that ought to be considered in assessing
233
whether a company had an effective compliance program. Overarching
considerations include “whether the program is adequately designed for
maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting wrongdoing by
employees and whether corporate management is enforcing the program
or is tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct
234
to achieve business objectives.” More specifically, prosecutors are
encouraged to inquire on a case-by-case basis:
 Is the corporation’s compliance program well designed?
 Is the program being applied earnestly and in good faith?
235
 Does the corporation’s compliance program work?

Relevant factors include:
[T]he comprehensiveness of the compliance program; the extent and
pervasiveness of the criminal misconduct; the number and level of the
corporate employees involved; the seriousness, duration, and
frequency of the misconduct; and any remedial actions taken by the
corporation, including, for example, disciplinary action against past
violators uncovered by the prior compliance program, and revisions to
236
corporate compliance programs in light of lessons learned.

Additionally, prosecutors should consider how quickly the company
disclosed wrongdoing, the independence of directors, and the
independence and reporting chains for auditing entities.
Those seeking a precisely defined standard will not be satisfied by this
model, but as I will argue in the next Subpart, a precisely defined standard
is not necessary. Precision of definition is at odds with the basic premise
that compliance programs are not one-size-fits-all: An effective
compliance program for a mid-size technology company may look very
different than an effective compliance program for a large pharmaceutical
company. The DOJ’s non-exhaustive list of factors is a good starting point
for defining a standard of effective policies and procedures.
B. Is There a Manageable Standard?
One concern about a good faith defense is whether such a standard
is specific enough to properly guide a jury. Bucy responds to this
anticipated objection to her ethos proposal by noting that fuzzy legal

233.
234.
235.
236.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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237

standards exist throughout the law. Fact-finders are routinely asked to
use their judgment in applying vague standards.
To take just one example, consider the vagueness and complexity of
jury instructions in a trial alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of
238
the Sherman Act. In such a case, the jurors will be instructed—among
other things—that to find the defendant guilty they must find, beyond a
reasonable doubt:
First, that the conspiracy the defendant is charged with participating in
actually existed during the time alleged in the indictment;
Second, that the defendant knowingly joined this conspiracy;
Third, that the defendant joined the conspiracy with the intent to
unreasonably restrain competition; and
Fourth, that the conspiracy concerned goods or services in interstate
239
(or foreign) commerce.

The instructions for each element, in turn, are quite complex. For
example, regarding the first element—the existence of an agreement—
240
jurors will be told that the agreement itself is the crime. They will then
be told that it does not matter if the agreement is carried out, or fails, or
241
even is inconsistently followed. Indeed, even were it proven that the
parties to the alleged agreement cheated on each other—in plain
contradiction of the alleged terms of the alleged agreement—that does
242
not mean there was no agreement.
None of which is incorrect as a matter of law, of course. The point is,
how difficult must this be to parse in practice? Jurors will be expected,
based on circumstantial evidence about meeting locations, telephone calls,
and market conduct, to discern whether there was an actual meeting of
minds between competitors about their intent to restrain competition. The
complexity of this one element can then be compounded multifold by the
introduction of a conscious parallelism instruction. Pursuant to that
instruction, jurors will be told—again, correctly—that similarity “of
business practices or even the fact that the defendants may have charged
identical prices for the same goods and services does not automatically
establish a conspiracy because such practices may be consistent with
243
ordinary competitive behavior in a free and open market.” They will also

237. See Bucy, supra note 148, at 1178–79 (offering the example of the difficulty of identifying
mens rea from necessarily circumstantial evidence).
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
239. 3 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions—Criminal 58-68 (2010)
(Instruction 58-44).
240. Id. at 58-70 (Instruction 58-45).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 58-79 (Instruction 58-49) (emphasis added).

Gilchrist_21 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

1166

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/24/2013 4:41 PM

[Vol. 64:1121

be told that this “is true even if they did so knowing that others were
244
following similar practices.”
As a result, there could be a price fixing case in which jurors are
entrusted to discern, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, whether two
competitors consciously agreed to fix prices (illegal), or whether they each,
independently and rationally, learned each other’s prices and,
independently and rationally, set their own prices at the same level (legal).
The epistemological challenge here is daunting. Indeed, it is so daunting
that I fear this example demonstrates that sometimes we ask juries to do
too much. But the fact remains that, compared to the challenge of
discerning whether two people agreed or instead acted independently as
you would expect them to act as business persons—where those two things
can look identical—the challenge of evaluating the efficacy of a
compliance program is not really so great.
Jury instructions could reflect a flexible standard like that set forth in
245
the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. Jurors should be asked to consider the
efficacy of the program as a whole. Instructions should explain that no
compliance program is perfect and that the mere fact that a violation
occurs does not mean that a compliance program is not effective.
Instructions should also point out that the structure of effective
compliance programs varies by company, industry, and other factors.
Finally, instructions could identify, in general terms, a list of factors that
should be considered in evaluating compliance programs. To the extent
that the assessment of a compliance program raises questions about
industry standards and best practices, these issues are routinely
presented to juries through expert testimony. Under these conditions, a
finder of fact—as well as a federal prosecutor—should be able to assess a
compliance program.
C. The Risk of Incentivizing Cosmetic Compliance
Another concern is the prospect of promoting “cosmetic
246
247
compliance.” Kimberly Krawiec has drawn attention to this issue.
Structuring, managing, and auditing compliance programs is a massive
248
industry, and yet the empirical data do not support the efficacy of these
249
Giving corporations a complete defense for having a
programs.
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. See supra Part IV.A.
246. See generally Krawiec, supra note 143.
247. See generally id.
248. Id. at 488 (“[T]he ethics and compliance consulting business—already a multi-billion dollar
industry—has seen a surge in demand.”).
249. Id. at 490 n.11 (“[T]he poor empirical showing of internal compliance structures as a means of
deterring organizational misconduct should cause more skepticism than evidenced in the legal and
management literature”). On the other hand, Miriam Baer suggests that the “sheer size of the
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particular type of program risks the inefficiency of bolstering demand for
legally prophylactic but otherwise ineffective compliance programs,
250
without an accompanying reduction in criminality. It also risks underdeterring corporate crime by shielding criminal conduct from prosecution
so long as there is a “window-dressing” of compliance efforts, however
251
ineffectual.
These risks seem both real and largely avoidable so long as we are
willing to entrust juries to discern between cosmetic programs and
effective programs. Jurors could be instructed, for example, that there is
no single ideal compliance program, and that the question for the jurors is
whether the corporation’s program was an effective one. Given that by the
time jurors are considering this question they would have already found a
violation of criminal law by an agent of the corporation, the jurors would
also need to be instructed that efficacy is not the same as capability of
preventing all wrongdoing. An effective compliance program may
nonetheless fail in some instances; indeed, no system is failsafe. The jury’s
job would be to determine whether the corporation’s compliance program
was implemented in good faith, whether it was structured adequately,
given the risks faced by the corporation, and whether its existence should
absolve the corporation of the wrongdoing committed by its employees.
To address Krawiec’s concern, the jury should also be instructed expressly
that having spent a lot of money on establishing a compliance program
does not mean it is an effective program and that a strong paper program
that is not adequately funded, implemented, or respected by corporate
policies and leadership is not an effective compliance program.
None of this suggests that discerning between an effective program
and a cosmetic program would be easy for jurors, but it does not seem
more difficult than many tasks we regularly entrust to jurors.
D. The Likely Effects of an Effective Compliance Program
Standard
Federal prosecutors are already instructed to take into account
whether a company has an effective compliance program in determining
whether to charge the corporation, but they are also expressly instructed
that “the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and of
itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct
compliance industry, which includes multiple American Lawyer 100 firms who proudly trumpet their
assistance on their websites, severely undercuts the notion that corporations and compliance providers
are engaged in a concerted, bad-faith attempt at intentional window-dressing.” Miriam Hechler Baer,
Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 952 (2009).
250. See generally Krawiec, supra note 143.
251. Id. at 491 (“[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not
deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides
both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.”).
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undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents.” So the first
effect of establishing a complete defense based on an effective compliance
program would be to allow the mere existence of an effective compliance
program to preclude liability. The second effect would be to shift the role
of assessing the compliance program from the prosecutor to the jury. This
latter effect is the most important.
The standard for corporate criminal liability remains respondeat
253
superior. Accordingly, “a corporation may be held criminally responsible
for [criminal] violations committed by its employees if they were acting
within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and for the
benefit of the corporation, even if . . . such acts were against corporate
254
policy or express instructions.” A prosecutor will consider the efficacy of
a compliance program in deciding whether to charge a corporation, but
once the corporation is charged, the compliance program becomes
irrelevant to the question of guilt.
Jurors, being asked whether the corporation is guilty of the crime
charged, should be asked to assess whether there is a basis to blame the
corporation qua corporation. One way to do this would be to ask the jurors
to make findings about whether the corporate culture or a particular policy
255
induced the wrongful conduct. While in the abstract this is a promising
idea, I have difficulty seeing how it would work in practice. On the other
hand, a corporation that has a truly effective compliance program will
generally have a culture that dissuades criminal conduct, and jurors could
be asked to assess the efficacy of the compliance problem according to
standards like those in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual. The overlap may not
be perfect, but a truly effective compliance program will be part of the
corporate culture, and the fact that it is effective means it will, more often
than not, inform employees faced with difficult decisions.
We should want jurors to consider the efficacy of a corporate
compliance program, because doing so will significantly align with
questions about whether there is a reason to blame the corporation for the
wrongful conduct. Moving questions about the efficacy of compliance
efforts to the jury would—to some degree—realign corporate criminal

252. U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.800 (2008).
253. One might propose that instead of creating a good faith defense, we should add an element
that the prosecution must establish the absence of an effective compliance program. This is only a
small distinction, as its impact is really just to shift the burden of proof. However, a good faith defense
would seem to be the better option, because adding an element requires the prosecution to prove a
negative at the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, and also because the defendant corporation
has the best access to the information about its good faith efforts and/or compliance program.
254. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983).
255. See Bucy, supra note 148, at 1128.
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liability with the expression of condemnation that ought to accompany
256
criminal sanctions.
The other obvious impact of precluding liability where there is an
effective compliance program would be the reduction in the number of
corporate criminal prosecutions. The new standard would make
convictions harder to secure; corporations would have less incentive to
accept negotiated resolutions where they had a strong compliance defense;
prosecutors would need to marshal resources to those cases they felt they
could prove beyond a reasonable doubt. There is nothing wrong with this,
unless it leads to under-enforcement, which it need not do.
As discussed above, there was probably good reason to penalize
AML and J&J for the wrongdoing, even if those corporations were not
257
themselves blameworthy. Each corporation was in the best position to
avoid the wrongful conduct and failed to do so. AML should have better
vetted or supervised Partucci. J&J should have better or more quickly
implemented its compliance programs when it acquired DePuy. Such
failures may not merit the condemnation of criminal sanctions, but they
ought to be corrected. Civil penalties—which might look very similar if
not identical to the penalties secured through criminal prosecution—
ought to be imposed. The difference would be the civil penalties would
not purport to be criminal. They would not carry the assertion that their
imposition merits opprobrium. Therefore, by avoiding that expression of
condemnation in cases where there is no basis for condemnation, civil
penalties would avoid the expressive dissonance that undermines
legitimacy and dilutes expressive efficacy.

Conclusion
Where the law deviates too far from strongly held norms, it risks
generating expressions at odds with those norms. This creates a dissonance
between personal morality and legal commands. Where the dissonance is
too great, one of two things must happen: the law will be perceived as less
legitimate, or violation of the law will cease to be perceived as a basis for
condemnation, eroding the distinctive expression associated with criminal
liability. Either resolution undermines the legitimacy of the law, the
persistence of the internal view, and eventually, the stability of the legal
system. Expressive problems are of real concern, and my hope is that the
expressive model that I have begun to develop in this Article will help
evaluate other rules and legal actions beyond corporate prosecutions.
256. The limitation “to some degree” is important. This change would do nothing about
substantive questions regarding what types of wrongdoing and harm are appropriately dealt with
through criminal law. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877. But the types of expressive failures identified
in the AML and J&J examples above would be addressed by this change.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 184–185.
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People blame corporations when there is a reason to do so. But the
legal standard for holding corporations criminally liable is too broad in
that it can apply criminal liability even where there is no basis to condemn
the entity. This application of criminal punishment without a basis for
condemnation generates expressive dissonance: The legal system is
applying condemnation when there is no basis for condemnation. The call
for abandoning the respondeat superior standard of liability is a good one
that can best be achieved by implementing a good faith defense. It is not
without problems, but the challenges are surmountable and the benefits
are worth it.
John Coffee once suggested that “society’s capacity to focus censure
258
and blame is among its scarcest resources.” To watch the news today is
to question this assertion: There seems to be more than enough blame to
go around. But Coffee’s point is right. Criminal law is not about blaming
in the way cable television is; it is about a measured and methodical
process by which blame is focused. Preserving the expressive function of
criminal law is important for the criminal law, it is important for the
perceived legitimacy and continued stability of the legal system, and it is
important for a well-functioning society generally.

258. See Coffee, supra note 61, at 1877.
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